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  1. (-FY2017) Growth and Poverty Reduction
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Modes of Collective Action in Village Economies:Evidence from Natural and Artefactual Field Experiments in a Developing Country

https://doi.org/10.18884/00000650
https://doi.org/10.18884/00000650
9e866662-ea50-4b9d-b6eb-94e31bfb718c
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
JICA-RI_WP_No.47_2012_2.pdf JICA-RI_WP_No.47_2012_2.pdf (772.2 kB)
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Item type 報告書 / Research Paper(1)
公開日 2012-08-01
タイトル
タイトル Modes of Collective Action in Village Economies:Evidence from Natural and Artefactual Field Experiments in a Developing Country
言語
言語 eng
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 collective action
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 social preference
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 natural and artefactual field experiment
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 irrigation
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 South Asia
資源タイプ
資源タイプ識別子 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18ws
資源タイプ research report
ID登録
ID登録 10.18884/00000650
ID登録タイプ JaLC
報告年度
日付 2012-08-01
日付タイプ Issued
著者 Sawada, Yasuyuki

× Sawada, Yasuyuki

WEKO 739

en Sawada, Yasuyuki

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Kasahara, Ryuji

× Kasahara, Ryuji

WEKO 740

en Kasahara, Ryuji

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Aoyagi, Keitaro

× Aoyagi, Keitaro

WEKO 741

en Aoyagi, Keitaro

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Shoji, Masahiro

× Shoji, Masahiro

WEKO 742

en Shoji, Masahiro

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Ueyama, Mika

× Ueyama, Mika

WEKO 743

en Ueyama, Mika

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抄録
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 In a canonical model of collective action, individual contribution to collective action is negatively correlated with group size. Empirical evidence on the group size effect has been mixed, partly due to heterogeneities in group activities. In this paper, we first construct a simple general model of collective action with the free-riding problem, altruism, public goods, and positive externalities of social networks. We then empirically test the theoretical implications of group size effect on individual contribution to four different types of collective action, i.e., monetary or nonmonetary contribution to directly or indirectly productive activities. To achieve this, we collect and employ artefactual field experimental data such as public goods and dictator games conducted in southern Sri Lanka under a natural experimental situation where the majority of farmers were relocated to randomly selected communities based on the government lottery. This unique situation enables us to identify the causal effects of community size on collective action. We find that the levels of collective action can be explained by the social preferences of farmers; we show evidence on the free-riding by self-interested households with no land holdings. The pattern of collective action, however, differs significantly by the mode of activities; the collective action which is directly related to production is less likely to suffer from the free rider problem than from indirectly productive activities. Finally, the monetary contribution is less likely to cause the free riding than the non-monetary contribution.
号
号 Working Paper;47
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