

Chapter 10

Working for Human Security: JICA's Experience

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Introduction

The concept of Human Security (HS) first appeared in Human Development Report (HDR) 1993 and HDR 1994 (UNDP 1993; UNDP 1994). The reports put forward the idea that people's security should be guaranteed not only on a state level but also on an individual level.

The Japanese government adopted this idea in 1998 as a principle that should be taken into account in its Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy. It financed the establishment of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security in 1999 and the Commission on Human Security in 2001. The final report of the commission in 2003, headed by Dr. Amartya Sen and Mme. Sadako Ogata, defined HS as guaranteeing the survival, livelihood, and dignity of all human beings. Fear (of armed conflict, crime, disease, natural disaster, etc.) and want (i.e., extreme poverty, unemployment, lack of food/water) are two major sources of human insecurity. The Japanese government revised its ODA Charter in August 2003 and included the principle of HS as one of its five basic policies.

JICA, as the most important ODA-implementing agency of the Japanese government, gradually introduced the HS concept into its activities after 1999. After Mme. Ogata became president of JICA in October 2003, the principle rapidly took root in the organization. In March 2004, HS was adopted as one of the three pillars of JICA's Reform Plan.¹ When the new JICA was formed in 2008 through a merger of the old JICA and the concession loan division of JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation), HS was again chosen as one of the four missions of the organization (Toda 2009).²

JICA has not collected statistical data on how much of its budget has been allocated to increasing HS. It is impossible to do so because it is extremely difficult to separate HS components from other components in the same project/programs.

1 The other two are "prioritizing the field" and "effectiveness, efficiency, and speed."

2 The other three are "addressing the global agenda," "reducing poverty through equitable growth," and "improving governance" (JICA 2008).




Fig. 10.1 Share of Fragile States in Japanese ODA (Net ODA Total, Excluding Debt Relief)

Source: Authors' calculation based on OECD Stat.

As a rough, representational indicator, however, the figure below shows Japan's ODA spending in 43 countries that the OECD defined in 2010 as "fragile states." Between 2003 and 2009, the share of Japanese ODA spending in these countries increased from 11.6 per cent to 24.4 per cent.³

Considering the growing importance of the HS agenda in Japan's ODA policy, this chapter will examine the challenges and problems JICA has faced in its HS-oriented field operations. More specifically, it will analyze four cases—Myanmar, the Philippines, Afghanistan, and Sudan—by focusing on the two major challenges: (1) possible contradictions between state security and human security and (2) special difficulties in the pursuit of comprehensive empowerment. Before going into the case studies, the following section will examine the process in which the Japanese government in general and JICA in particular adopted the HS principle. This will help clarify the nature of the two challenges mentioned above for Japan's HS strategy.

³ Authors' calculation of net ODA total (excluding debt relief) based on OECD Stat.

The Process of Mainstreaming Human Security in Japan's ODA Policy

The government of Japan was one of the first governments to adopt HS as a principle of its foreign policy. It was then Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi who first mentioned the concept in a speech he gave in Singapore in May 1998. His primary concern was to help Southeast Asian countries that had suddenly faced a serious socioeconomic crisis in 1997/98 (Fukushima 2010). The concept of HS was quickly integrated into the 1999 ODA Annual Report (JMFA 2000).⁴

However, the concept had not yet been clearly defined and widely shared among the various actors in Japan. For one thing, differing from Mr. Obuchi's focus on socioeconomic insecurity, four of the five examples of HS issues listed in the Annual Report—the Kosovo War, anti-personnel mines, emergency assistance for relief and recovery from natural disasters, and countermeasures against drug abuse—were concerned not with social and economic development but with problems related to “freedom from fear.” Just one issue, women in development (WID), was less closely associated with “freedom from fear.” The same understanding of HS was apparent in the ODA Mid-Term Policy of Japan, which was announced in August 1999. In this document, human insecurity is treated as threats against individuals in the fields of environmental destruction, starvation, drug abuse, organized crime, infectious diseases, human rights infringements, regional conflicts, and antipersonnel mines (JMFA 1999). Most of these threats are related to “fear” rather than “want.” In the ODA Mid-Term Policy of Japan of 1999, “freedom from want” issues were treated under the banner of “human-centered development” separate from human security.

“Human-centered development,” a term equivalent to “human development,” had been most frequently used in the pre-1999 ODA Annual Reports to indicate the purpose of aid for basic livelihoods, education, and health. A report of the advisory Council on External Economic Cooperation submitted to Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori in September 2000 also recommended that “human-centered development” be the basic principle of Japan's ODA policy. In this report, one section was dedicated to “Human Security and Economic Cooperation,” in which the authors called for active cooperation with NGOs across borders and emphasized the importance of conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance in violent-conflict situation, and post-conflict efforts for rehabilitation and reconstruction (JMFA 2001).

Apparently, HS was being treated as a new task to be added to the existing mission of “human-centered development.” This is partly because peace-building (including the prevention of the recurrence of violent conflicts) became a major mission for international society after a series of tragic experiences in Rwanda, the Balkans, and many other places around the world, to which the Japanese government felt an urgent need to respond in order to avoid the kind of embarrassment it faced

4 ODA Annual Report was renamed into ODA White Paper in 2001.

in the wake of the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait in 1990.⁵ Consequently, the concept of HS came to be understood as being closely associated with conflict situation. It is not by chance that the ODA Mid-Term Policy of 1999 included conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction as one of seven priority tasks of Japan's ODA policy.

However, a dilemma for Japan was the limitation it had with regard to the deployment of military forces abroad. Although the national Diet had passed a law (Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations) in 1992 to allow the dispatch of Self Defense Forces overseas to participate in United Nations PKO missions, several conditions were imposed on the missions. For instance, the Japanese government has to secure the consensus of all stakeholders involved in the conflict before deciding to participate in the PKO mission. The dispatched troops have to take a neutral stance with respect to all stakeholders in the conflict. Furthermore, the use of arms is strictly limited to self-defense. Because of these limitations, SDF's participation in PKO missions has been limited in frequency and small in scale. For this reason the Japanese contribution to peace-building faced limitations from the outset. It must be supported not by military means but mostly by non-military actions, of which ODA is a key component. The Japanese government naturally relied on ODA for the social and economic development that had occupied the central part of Japan's overseas assistance under the banner of "human-centered development."

Based on this understanding of HS, Japan took the initiative to create the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security in March 1999. Then, at the United Nations Millennium Summit of September 2000, Prime Minister Mori declared that HS was a principle of Japan's foreign policy and proposed the creation of a Commission on Human Security. This commission was subsequently established with Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen as co-chairs and published its final report in 2003.

This report helped to clarify relations among the three key concepts of Japan's ODA policy: human-centered development, peace-building, and human security. First, by defining HS as "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear," it integrated the first two concepts as similarly important missions to realize HS. Now, HS is not part of the human-centered development mission but the other way around.

Second, however, "freedom from want" and "human-centered development", were not exactly the same. The Sen/Ogata report distinguishes HS from human development ("human-centered development" in Japan) by emphasizing the downside risks. Human development focuses on "expanding opportunities for people so that progress is fair" while "human security complements human development by deliberately focusing on 'downside risks'" (CHS 2003). This focus implies that HS considers not only people who are actually vulnerable, but also those who are potentially vulnerable. To prepare for these potential vulnerabilities,

5 Although Japan contributed to as much as 13 billion US dollars to the anti-Saddam Hussein campaign, it received scant international acknowledgment.

reactive protective measures alone are not enough; proactive assistance to empower people is necessary. Furthermore, since insecurities can be caused by many factors (armed conflict, extreme poverty, natural disaster, pandemic diseases, etc.), the HS agenda will inevitably cover a broad range of actions.

In short, the HS principle now covered both the protection and empowerment of people in comprehensive issue areas, namely in both want and fear.

However, it took some time before this new understanding of HS was broadly accepted by stakeholders in Japan. In the new ODA Charter adopted by the Cabinet three months after the publication of Sen/Ogata report, HS was only briefly mentioned as one of the five basic principles of Japan's ODA policy. The other four were support for self-help efforts, consideration of fairness, utilization of Japanese experience and expertise, and partnership and collaboration with the international community (JMFA 2003).

The concept of HS as defined in the Sen/Ogata report was fully accepted by the Japanese government in the new ODA Mid-Term Policy announced by the Foreign Ministry in February 2005 (JMFA 2005). This document clearly stated that HS covers both freedom from want and freedom from fear and is concerned with both protection and empowerment. It further stated that HS was to be the principle that would lead activities in all four priority issue areas of Japan—poverty reduction, sustainable growth, global issues, and peace-building.

In this way, HS covering comprehensive issues had become the most important principle of Japan's ODA policy by the beginning of 2005. The Japanese government sought to promote this HS agenda internationally as well. Its main weapons were aid for socioeconomic development. By this time, however, Japan had been accumulating experience in post-conflict assistance, including DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) and/or post-conflict reconstruction in Cambodia, Timor Leste, and Afghanistan and was ready to expand its activities in this area. Still, direct military involvement was not considered as part of the HS mission. Consequently, the Canadian initiative to connect HS with more punitive (eventually military) actions posed a difficulty for the Japanese government.

In December 2001, the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), an advisory body to the United Nations established by the Canadian initiative, launched the concept of “the responsibility to protect (R2P).” It argued that the sovereign state has the responsibility to protect its own people, and therefore, if it does not have the will or capacity to do so, the international community can assume that responsibility. In extreme cases of human insecurity, even forceful intervention would be allowed (ICISS 2001). This interpretation of HS could not be easily accepted by the Japanese government. For a long time, the postwar Constitution of Japan had been interpreted as prohibiting the overseas use of military force. If Japan had actively endorsed the R2P doctrine, Tokyo feared, it would have faced strong criticism both domestically and among its Asian neighbors that it had changed its traditional policy. In addition to this concern, as Jun Honna (2012: 105) points out, the Japanese government feared that the R2P

approach would undermine Japan's diplomatic initiative to promote non-military HS approach.

The Sen/Ogata report mentioned above admits "long-term conditions of oppression and deprivation" as one of the menaces against human security. However, it took the position that "human security reinforces state security but does not replace it" (CHS 2003: 5). The report avoided mention of the possibility of forceful intervention in a sovereign state. As a consequence, two interpretations of HS, Japanese and Canadian, coexisted.

When the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the World Summit Outcome in September 2005 (UNGA 2005), the R2P and HS were treated in separate paragraphs. Three paragraphs were devoted to the R2P, in which the Outcome declared that the international community should take "collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council," if "national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." In the meantime, the paragraph devoted to HS simply confirmed the Sen/Ogata definition of HS as "freedom from fear and freedom from want" without mentioning the R2P. Similarly, the R2P paragraphs did not refer to HS at all.

Nor did the January 2009 Report of the Secretary General on "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect" mention HS. The term "human security" appears in only one paragraph (out of 72) referring to a "partnership between the intergovernmental body and a civil society network" in the Economic Community of West African States (United Nations 2009).

This Secretary General report presented a three pillar strategy for advancing the R2P agenda. The primary responsibility goes to the sovereign state to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Pillar two is international assistance to a government that lacks the capacity to protect people from humanitarian disasters. Pillar three permits collective action by the UN member states when a state is manifestly failing to provide protection. The collective action ranges from pacific measures to coercive ones.

Clearly, pillar two of the above report partially coincides with the Japanese interpretation of HS. However, the HS agenda is much broader than pillar two of the R2P agenda. The HS mission includes both protection and empowerment in many issue areas ranging from extreme poverty, epidemics, sudden economic crises, natural disaster, and cross-border crimes to violent conflicts. The R2P mission, in contrast, mainly focuses on violent conflict situations in which extreme atrocities against human being can most likely be committed.

The Japanese government apparently intends to continue promoting the HS agenda internationally by clearly separating HS from the R2P mission. In September 2012, Japan, together with twenty-four other countries, co-sponsored the draft resolution to follow up to the HS paragraph of the 2005 World Summit Outcome (UNGA 2012). It reconfirms that HS is an approach to assist UN member states in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges

to survival, livelihood and dignity of their people. It also lists eight points as a “common understanding on the notion of human security.” Interestingly, five of the eight points are dedicated to distinguishing HS from pillar three of the R2P. For instance, the fifth point states: “Human security does not entail the threat or the use of force or coercive measures. Human security does not replace State security.”

In short, non-military assistance continues to be the means by which the Japanese government promotes the comprehensive HS agenda internationally. The Japanese approach to HS, however, has faced special challenges when it is put into practice in the actual field of ODA, and this is the subject of the next section.

Challenges in JICA’s Implementation of the Human Security Principle

The first challenge is the potential contradiction between state security and HS. The HS principle dictates that Japan should assist people who are facing a survival crisis. If a recipient government willingly accepts the Japanese offer of assistance to enhance its physical and human capacity to improve the HS of its citizens, there will be no problem. The difficulty arises when certain governments are unwilling or reluctant to address human insecurity problems within their own borders. Since the Japanese government refuses to use force or the threat thereof, it needs alternative means to get access to the suffering people. The only possible means is to persuade the reluctant government to accept HS-oriented measures as neutral or nationwide programs, or as measures that can eventually contribute to strengthening state security.

The second challenge stems from Japan’s highly comprehensive understanding of HS. The Sen/Ogata report emphasizes that the HS principle address the most vulnerable people in a society. However, as discussed above, it also distinguishes HS from the human development concept by focusing on the downside risks. In other words, the HS agenda includes not only the protection of actually vulnerable people but also the empowerment of potentially vulnerable people. In addition, it must cover many areas to secure both freedom from fear and freedom from want. In fact, since Mme. Ogata became president in October 2003, JICA has stepped up its efforts to quickly enter countries with HS crises to provide emergency aid and to transition smoothly from emergency humanitarian assistance (protection) to longer-term development assistance (empowerment). Measures for protection are visible in the sense that one can assess results relatively easily by looking at people’s physical conditions. In contrast, the mission of comprehensive empowerment poses a difficult problem because it is hard to assess the long-term effects of individual projects or programs on people’s capacity to overcome broad downside risks. This difficulty has become more notable recently as demand for evaluations of the effectiveness of ODA activities is increasing both domestically and internationally.

Considering these challenges to the HS principle, this section will analyze JICA’s HS-oriented activities by focusing on two issues: (1) How JICA has dealt

with the potential contradiction between state and human security; and (2) How JICA has sought to empower people to prepare for broad potential risks. Four conflict-ridden countries (Myanmar, the Philippines, Afghanistan, and Sudan) in which JICA has been active were chosen as case studies, since conflict-prone countries most frequently face a contradiction between the two securities and feel the need to comprehensively empower people to be free from both fear and want.

The Case of Myanmar

Although HS had not yet been integrated into Japan's ODA policy, one early case of a project that was eventually HS-oriented is JICA's alternative development assistance to the North Shan State of Myanmar. The North Shan State, on the Chinese border, was formerly a major poppy-producing area. It is inhabited by minority ethnic groups, some of whom were engaged in armed conflict with the central government, at least until the 1989 ceasefire agreement was signed between the rebel forces in the Kokang region and the military government. In the 1990s, indigent villagers continued to rely on poppy production and smuggling for their livelihoods. The military government, known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which had annulled the 1990 general election and faced international sanctions, feared the intrusion of foreign personnel into these politically sensitive minority regions.⁶

Japan was among the first countries to recognize the military government after the 1988 coup. However, it continued to conform to the US and European policy of imposing international sanctions on Myanmar by suspending new ODA provisions. Japanese support was limited only to those projects that were already underway and humanitarian/emergency aid (Koppel and Orr 1993: 151). In the meanwhile, the Japanese government continued its attempt to persuade the SLORC government to start moving toward democratization. On one such occasion, in 1993, Koichi Kato, an influential leader of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), met First Secretary Khin Kyunt, the third most important leader of SLORC and the head of the Work Committee for the Development of Border Areas and National Races of Myanmar. This committee had been organized in 1989 to promote economic development in the border areas to placate minority ethnic groups. At that meeting, First Secretary Khin Kyunt complained about the difficulty in eradicating poppy production in border areas due to the lack of alternative products. Subsequently, Kato consulted with Tomomitsu Iwakura, an agricultural policy specialist from the LDP, about the possibility of introducing Soba (buckwheat) into the cool hill regions of Myanmar. Iwakura in turn spoke to the president of the Japan Association of Noodle Businesses and secured a commitment to purchase Burmese buckwheat (Araki 2012; "Drug control and Japan" website; ADPEA website).

⁶ Descriptions in this subsection are based on information obtained from JICA Knowledge Site: Myanmar, JICA (2009), and Umezaki (2007) unless otherwise indicated.

In 1995, when the Myanmar government softened its stance toward the opposition and released Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, the Japanese government announced its intention to reopen its ODA to Myanmar to support Basic Human Needs projects (Sugishita 1999: 402–404). In this context, Iwakura visited Khin Kyunt with a personal letter from Kato in 1996 (“Drug control and Japan” website). The Myanmar government finally agreed to start a project to introduce buckwheat into the Kokang region of North Shan State. This process shows how the Japanese government took advantage of personal relations between Japanese and Burmese politicians and persuaded the Myanmar government, using a combination of carrot and stick, so that the latter accepted a Japanese project in a conflict-affected region.

The buckwheat project began in 1998, before Japan’s adoption of the HS principle, by dispatching JICA experts in its production. JICA test-cultivated buckwheat, trained villagers, provided them with seeds and fertilizer, and helped export their product to Japan. Exports began in 1999 and reached the peak of 90 tons in 2003.

In practice, however, the alternative development project in the Kokang region was facing difficulties by 2002, as the buckwheat produced in the region was unable to meet the quality or price demands of the Japanese market. In the meantime, the Myanmar government had reinforced its policy of forcibly eradicating poppy fields, depriving villagers of what was still an important source of income. As a result, indigent villagers faced a serious HS crisis in 2003. More than 100 people starved to death while 4,000 people were infected with malaria and 270 died of the disease. JICA launched emergency aid in 2004, but to avoid duplication with the assistance offered by the World Food Programme (WFP) and international NGOs, it avoided the direct provision of food and medical services and provided the villagers with seeds, fertilizer, and mosquito nets. JICA also reconstructed a main road in the Kokang region to facilitate emergency aid activities.

In tandem with this emergency aid, JICA started a long-term Comprehensive Village Development project in 2005, in which JICA experts engaged in participatory development activities for basic health and education, *kaizen* (improvement of everyday life), and agricultural production, including alternative development. To JICA’s regret, military clashes recurred in the Kokang region in August 2009 and JICA experts were forced to leave the region. The programs were sustained by the Burmese counterparts but inevitably on a smaller scale.

The Myanmar case indicates that the Japanese government maintained relations with high-level officials in the military government and attempted to persuade them to democratize the regime and to accept Japanese aid for conflict-affected regions. It was an exasperatingly time-consuming process. Furthermore, the buckwheat project that finally got underway in 1998 focused on only one agricultural product and consequently faced serious difficulties when the product was found to be unable to replace poppy as a better source of income for the villagers. On the basis of these initial stumbles, JICA designed a more comprehensive HS project in 2005, covering broader agricultural sectors as well as education and health activities.

It also took the empowerment approach by involving villagers in the planning and implementation of various projects. Unfortunately, the activities had to be scaled back with the relapse of military clashes.

At present, thanks to a substantial, if not full, democratization of the Myanmar regime and the cease-fire agreements, JICA expected to step up its activities in the region. It will, however, be a long time before JICA can start evaluating its empowerment activities in the Kokang region.

The Case of the Philippines

Mindanao is one of the poorest and most conflict-ridden regions in the Philippines. Even after the conclusion of the 1996 peace agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), another Muslim group called the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) continued to fight the government, with intermittent cease-fires and peace negotiations.⁷

The Japanese government offered its Filipino counterpart aids for social and economic development in the conflict-affected areas of Mindanao so that people under the influence of MNLF could enjoy a peace dividend, thus contributing to the consolidation of peace in the region. The Estrada government was reluctant but the following Arroyo government sought Japanese assistance positively. Subsequently, the Japanese government launched a “Support Package for Peace and Stability in Mindanao” in 2002. This “package” was primarily planned for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) governed by MNLF and comprised measures such as human resource development and improvement of administrative capabilities for the ARMM government, the design of development plans for local business promotion and road construction, the provision of agricultural extension services, and community infrastructure development. This last, which was supported by a large concession loan from JBIC, aimed at involving villagers in the planning and implementation of local infrastructure projects to build schools, health centers, portable water supply facilities, and roads. These measures aim at long-term empowerment rather than short-term protection.

In the meanwhile, the Arroyo government and MILF concluded a framework agreement for the resumption of peace talks in 2001, but the subsequent negotiation for a final peace agreement was slow. The Japanese government, with the conviction that efforts for restoration and development would help peace talks and reconciliation, offered providing assistances for MILF-influenced areas. This proposal was accepted by both the Arroyo government and the Bansamoro Development Agency (BDA) of MILF. As a consequence, in 2006, the Japanese Embassy expanded grassroots grant assistance programs to the areas, and the JICA started a community development project similar to that in the ARMM in the following year. This project, together with previous projects in Mindanao

⁷ Descriptions in this subsection are based on information obtained from JICA Knowledge Site: the Philippines unless otherwise indicated.

(including ARMM), was labeled as one comprehensive program called the Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development (J-BIRD). This was a rare case of Japan entering a conflict-affected region before a peace agreement was reached. The Japanese government took this initiative because it believed that it was trusted by both the Arroyo government and MILF as a religiously and culturally neutral force.

In 2006, Japan joined the International Monitoring Team (IMT) that had been established in 2004 to monitor the implementation of the 2003 cease-fire agreement between the Philippine government and MILF. Japan dispatched an expert in socioeconomic development to join the international team. A Supreme Court order on the land issue in Mindanao led to a recurrence of military clashes in 2008, but when the peace negotiations restarted, a new group called the International Contact Group (ICG) was organized to attend and observe the negotiations and ensure the implementation of mutually agreed agreements. Japan was once again invited to be a member. In addition, the Japanese government mediated the first-ever meeting between the President of the Philippines (Benigno Aquino III) and the top leader of the MILF (Chairman Murad Ibrahim), which was held in August 2011 at a hotel near the Narita International Airport. In October 2012, a framework agreement for peace was signed between the peace panels of both sides, in which they committed themselves to peaceful transition toward the enlargement of the Muslim autonomous region and the possible renaming of the region to a Bangsamoro region.

In short, the contradiction between state security and human security was minor in the Philippines because the Arroyo government and the Aquino government, if not the Estrada government, were positive in accepting external assistance for the socioeconomic development of the conflict-affected areas of Mindanao in the belief that improving living conditions could soften armed resistance by MILF. This position of the Philippine government coincided with the expectation of the Japanese government that actual projects/programs for socioeconomic development should help facilitate peace negotiations. Japanese assistance for Mindanao can therefore be regarded as a typical example of an external actor assisting a sovereign state whose capacity, not necessarily its will, is insufficient to guarantee people's HS.

As for the comprehensive-empowerment aspect of the HS, J-BIRD is certainly a comprehensive endeavor, including community development projects, agricultural extension, and administrative capacity building for planning, rule-making, and implementation. Unfortunately, given its short history it is impossible for now to make any assessment of its impact on people's capacity to cope with various downside risks. However, it should be noted that the HS-oriented activities enhanced opportunities for the contending parties to meet frequently and learn about each other. To achieve meaningful results for the residents, officials from the central and local governments on the one hand and officials from MILF's Basngsamoro Development Agency (BDA) were compelled to work together, which led to their eventually developing confidence in one another. In this sense,

Japanese aid for socioeconomic development has contributed to peace-building in Mindanao, thus removing one of the major downside risks.

The Case of Afghanistan

Afghanistan was one of the largest recipients of Japanese ODA for the last ten years. JICA started by supplying emergency aid, but quickly moved to implement a broad range of initiatives in the areas of health, education, agricultural production, vocational training, urban planning, and many other sectors. In addition, most of these JICA projects feature the element of empowerment.⁸

At the beginning, it was expected that the Taliban forces would be gradually removed from the country by US and NATO's military action, as well as through socioeconomic development supported by foreign aid. In this context, state security and HS were complementary as the Afghan government itself eagerly sought foreign aid. As in the Philippines, Japanese ODA aimed to improve the Afghan government's capacity to enhance the HS of its people.

JICA's activities in Afghanistan have been very comprehensive in that they have encompassed the reconstruction and strengthening of the National Tuberculosis Institute (NTI), vocational training, reconstruction and maintenance of the rice-production extension center at Jalalabad, preparation of manuals for school teachers, reconstruction of the international airport and inter-state roads, and the DDR of ex-combatants. In most of the projects, the participatory method was used to empower Afghan officials, educational and medical staff, workers, and farmers.

The best example of JICA's comprehensive-empowerment approach, however, is the community development project called the Inter-Communal Rural Development Project (IRDP), which was implemented in Bamiyan, Kandahar, and Balkh Provinces from 2005 to 2010. This project shares a similar participatory approach with those in Kokang and Mindanao, but differed in its clustering method. Building on the successful National Solidarity Programme (NSP), JICA and the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) attempted to group three to six communities together to implement cluster-wide public works such as the construction of inter-village roads, drinking water supply networks, irrigation dams, and micro-hydro power plants. Villagers were required to participate in the planning and implementation of these construction works in order to obtain block grants.

The dual motives of the IRDP were first to improve villagers' living conditions and second to strengthen MRRD's capacity to reach people. For the first purpose, IRDP attempted to complement the NSP as the latter was confined to individual isolated villages and consequently had limited effectiveness for infrastructure projects covering broad areas like those mentioned above. As for the second

⁸ Descriptions in this subsection are based on information obtained from JICA Knowledge Site: Afghanistan and JICA Research Institute (2012) unless otherwise indicated.

purpose, it is important to remember that no official administrative structure existed below the provincial level when the new government was organized in 2002. The NSP was an attempt to construct a village-level planning and implementation mechanism (called CDC, or Community Development Council) and associate it with the central government. The IRDP was an attempt to complement the CDC-central government connection by creating an intermediary (Cluster CDC) between the villages and the central government. The IRDP thus attempted to empower both villagers and the government to implement a range of projects that would help improve people's HS.

In some regions, the IRDP reportedly contributed to improving HS by building confidence among once antagonistic villages and by strengthening people's resilience to natural disasters. One good example is the Sheberto region of the Bamiyan Province where the Cluster CDC planned and constructed a reservoir. The process of planning and implementation opened up opportunities for dialogue and collaboration among communities that had once been in violent conflict with each other. This reservoir also relieved the villages of the HS risk stemming from drought.

As the IRDP was regarded as highly successful, the method of CDC clustering was adopted by the NSP as part of its second phase program in 2008. Now the NSP would take on the cluster CDC program at the Bamiyan, Nangarhar, and Balkh Provinces by using the World Bank Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) (World Bank website). The NSP also cooperated with JICA experts to edit the Annex for the NSP manual to be used for its cluster program.

The cluster program is new. It started in 2005 and was scaled up only in 2008. In addition, the application of the approach is still confined to three provinces. Although there are some indications (such as the case of the reservoir in Sherberto) that the approach has contributed to the improvement of HS, more time is needed before we can start assessing the full potential of the program.

A further concern is the worsening of security in Taliban-affected areas. JICA's activities have been adversely affected as indicated by the withdrawal of its Japanese personnel from Kandahar in April 2006. The Afghan case indicates a limitation of the non-military approach in a country where some of the stakeholders are committed to violent methods and continue to threaten HS. The Japanese government has assisted the Afghan government by sharing the cost of maintaining the police force but does not provide aid to strengthen its military capability. Hopefully, visible improvements in living conditions in the regions where JICA is working can have demonstration effects for Taliban-affected areas and help to weaken violent resistance, as has happened in Mindanao.

The Case of Sudan

In Sudan, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was reached between the government and the Southern anti-government movements in January 2005. However, the situation was so precarious that the potential contradiction between

state security and human security was as great as in Myanmar. To reach vulnerable people, JICA needed to persuade the unenthusiastic Khartoum government to accept Japan's ODA activities in the South. To do that, JICA proved its neutrality to the government by offering assistance to both North and South in an equal and balanced manner. In fact, the same number of trainees were chosen from North and South so that they could attend JICA-arranged training courses for water supply management (in Ethiopia), science education/nursing/HIV (in Kenya), and hospital management (in Egypt) after 2006.⁹

Later, however, in the face of the grave HS crisis in the South, JICA concentrated its efforts on the South, while its efforts in North Sudan were delayed. Sensing the frustrations from the Khartoum government, in 2008 JICA renewed its efforts in North Sudan in the areas of maternal and child health care, rice production, and the training of personnel for water-supply stations. JICA also organized a training program in March 2011 (before the independence of South Sudan) for customs officers in Mombasa, inviting officers from both North and South Sudan to participate.

Even in Darfur, JICA opted to work with, not against, the Sudanese government to reach people in a HS crisis. Together with the federal and state governments, JICA designed a training program for midwifery trainers and instructors on well reconstruction, woodwork, electrical instrument and car repairs in 2008. JICA's policy has been to stay as close as possible to vulnerable people to implement HS projects.

The nature of Japan's assistance to South Sudan in the early post-CPA period was primarily for the protection of the suffering people. It provided financial resources to international organizations for emergency humanitarian purposes such as food provision, treatment of infectious diseases in children, and the repatriation of externally and internally displaced persons.

In parallel with these protection-oriented assistances, JICA started to plan more empowerment-oriented projects. The construction of the Juba river port was one early example. Construction started in September 2006 and was completed in one year. The port was vital to connecting South Sudan with the North and the outside world. It was basic infrastructure based on which South Sudan would consolidate its political and economic life as a new state. Another example of an empowerment-oriented project was the rehabilitation and expansion of a vocational training school for local residents and ex-combatants. JICA not only provided the necessary instruments and materials but also trained instructors at the school. The training courses included construction work, car repairs, woodwork, welding, electrical work, and secretarial work. The courses began in 2007, training 2,430 people over the subsequent three years and four months. It is reported that 71 per cent of the graduates successfully found employment.

⁹ Descriptions in this subsection are based on information obtained from JICA Knowledge Site: Sudan; JICA Knowledge Site: South Sudan; and Shishido (forthcoming) unless otherwise indicated.

In addition to these activities, JICA has implemented, among others, a livelihood improvement project near Juba City, the training of primary-school science/math teachers, hospital management, and the construction of a nurse and midwife training school. In all of these projects, JICA attempted to involve relevant officials from the state governments and from the central government (the provisional autonomous Government of Southern Sudan until July 2011 and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan thereafter). Many of the projects have had the clear purpose of empowering local people and government officials to nurture and strengthen their ability to improve HS conditions in the new nation.

However, although Japan sharply expanded grant aid and technical-cooperation assistance to Sudan, from 2.11 million US dollars in 2005 to 42.72 million dollars in 2006 and to 109.64 million dollars in 2008 (OECD.Stat), this was still too small to satisfy even the basic humanitarian needs of South Sudan because the aid needed to be shared by North and South Sudan and the latter started from extremely low living standards. There is a long way to go to evaluate the long-term effects of JICA projects for the empowerment of the people and the government of South Sudan.

The Sudanese case also demonstrates a limitation of the Japanese non-military approach to HS. As with the Afghan situation, eruptions of violence in various regions of South Sudan have impeded the scaling-up of socioeconomic development measures. In contrast to the case in Afghanistan, Japan decided to participate in the United Nations PKO Mission in South Sudan and began dispatching SDF troops there in January 2012. However, the number of troops is limited (no more than 370 soldiers are stationed in South Sudan) and their primary mission is to engage in construction work under the command of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). Although the SDF is cooperating with JICA and the Foreign Ministry of Japan in some construction work, their mission is not to serve as a fighting force to assure security at the project sites.

In short, JICA took the same approach of persuasion in Sudan as it did in Myanmar to get access to vulnerable people whose HS was in a grave danger. In Sudan, it attempted to balance its activities in North and South, thus benefiting both in an equal manner. However, peace between North and South has not yet been consolidated, which forces JICA to continue its precarious balancing and persuasion strategy to enhance its projects for socioeconomic development in South Sudan. The process is inevitably slow. Comprehensive empowerment, one of the major objectives of Japan's HS strategy, is only a long-term possibility.

Conclusion

In its international promotion of the HS agenda, the Japanese government has clearly separated HS from the R2P agenda, which permits the exercise of force in the cases of extreme atrocities against humans. For the Japanese government, the improvement of HS should reinforce state security and, therefore, no military

action would be necessary to implement HS-oriented projects. JICA accepted this interpretation of the HS agenda and expected that concrete socioeconomic measures would reduce antagonisms among contending forces and eventually contribute to solving armed conflict, one of the major sources of human insecurity, while simultaneously improving state security.

Among our case countries, the Philippines has offered the only case in which the Japanese expectation appears to be realized. The J-BIRD program, together with the Japanese government's involvement in the peace process, has seemingly contributed to confidence building between the Philippine government and the MILF. This success, however, is partially thanks to the positive behavior of the Philippine government in accepting JICA's offers to supplement its insufficient capacity to achieve the socioeconomic development of Mindanao. This positive behavior on the part of the Philippine government helped the active involvement of JICA, which in turn helped nurture more cordial relations between the contending forces.

This kind of virtuous circle has not yet been observed in the other three countries. On the contrary, the recurrence of violent clashes has impeded the scaling-up or expansion of socioeconomic projects. In Afghanistan, although the government was ready to accept external assistance, the Taliban has persisted in its violence and has rejected foreign aid. In Myanmar and Sudan, the governments were not enthusiastic about foreign aid activities in the conflict-affected regions but were persuaded to accept them. However, government forces and minority-group rebels have fought intermittently until recently in Myanmar. In Sudan, the independence of the South has failed to alleviate military tension in the border regions. In these countries, long and persistent efforts will be needed to achieve JICA's aim to promote peace through non-military socioeconomic projects.

As for the comprehensive-empowerment aspect of the HS agenda, the concept of empowerment has posed no problem to JICA since self-help and human resource development have always been the basic principles of Japan's ODA policy. In JICA's experience, providing security solely through the provision of physical goods/facilities and social services has only been observed in the early post-conflict phase of humanitarian aid. In all four countries studied in this chapter, initiatives that attempt to empower individuals, communities, and public organizations for sustained development have been the most prominent aspect of JICA's activities.

The comprehensiveness of the HS agenda, which is regarded as necessary for people to be prepared for various downside risks, has created more challenges for JICA. In all four countries examined in this chapter, JICA has attempted to be comprehensive in its project and program designs. However, compared with the formidable tasks these conflict-affected countries face in protecting and empowering their people, JICA's resources are limited. JICA cannot yet claim that its activities have been effective in comprehensively empowering these countries.

Considering its limited resources, JICA will need to enhance its current policy of cooperating and coordinating with other international, bilateral, and

non-governmental actors in order to promote the comprehensive-empowerment agenda. To do so, however, JICA and these actors will need to share a common understanding of the HS agenda. Shaping this understanding is another major challenge for JICA.

The HS approach became mainstream in Japan only in the mid-2000s. JICA's effort to improve HS of actually and potentially vulnerable people have just begun. It will need to persevere in the years to come.

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