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Convergence of Aid Models in Emerging Donors? Learning Processes, Norms and Identities, and Recipients

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Convergence of Aid Models in Emerging Donors? Learning Processes, Norms and Identities, and Recipients

Hisahiro Kondoh*

Abstract

This paper analyses aid models of emerging economies in terms of their orientation to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) aid model. This paper first provides a short literature review. After summarizing the DAC aid model, several hypotheses to account for the convergence process of aid models are considered, followed by a discussion of how recipient perceptions of desirable aid may also work indirectly to promote both the convergence and divergence of aid models. In addition, this paper considers the hypothesis that the convergence and divergence of aid models may be promoted and inhibited by a donor's learning of other models as well as predominant norms and identities, which are shared by major aid-related stakeholders.

Secondly, this paper provides a brief overview of some characteristics of individual donors such as China, India, South Africa and South Korea and Arab countries. Arab donors have created an Islamic aid model, China utilizes an emerging superpower aid model, South Africa advocates a Southern hybrid aid model, and South Korea has established an Asian DAC aid model. While China and India have kept their distance from the DAC aid model, the aid models of South Africa and Arab donors have incorporated elements of the DAC aid model, with the Korean aid model introducing it most completely.

Thirdly, the paper will explore how the perceptions of recipients, donor learning from other donors, and the norms and identities of emerging donors may influence different levels of convergence of aid models. In terms of recipient perceptions, Chinese aid has generally been appreciated partially because the approach is distinct from the DAC aid model. South Africa has neighboring countries that are cautious about the asymmetric relationship and trade dependency on South Africa. To ease their concerns, South Africa incorporated elements of the DAC aid model, while offering some kind of assistance through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and DBSA. Donor learning of other models is relevant to South Africa and South Korea. Identities and norms of donors are quite influential in building and re-building the aid models. China has a 'superpower identity' and Arab donors have a 'religious identity'; these outstanding identities and norms underlie their unique aid models, which potentially challenge the established international aid regime. Unlike 'norm-makers' in China, middle powers in the South and North, as 'norm-takers', follow international aid regimes, regardless of the difference in convergence levels. South Africa balances the DAC aid model with African solidarity, while South Korea, as a full member of DAC, may promote strong convergence.

Keywords: international aid regime, DAC, convergence, aid models, norms and identities

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1. Introduction

This paper deals with the question of why the aid models of some emerging donors have moved towards convergence with the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) aid model and why others have not. Recently, in-depth analyses have been published by Kondoh et al. (2010) and Saidi and Wolf (2011), with the aim of understanding *how* emerging donors might be considered diverse. However, it is still a puzzle as to *why* the different aid models of emerging donors could be considered close to or distant from the international aid regime, particularly in constructivist terms. By exploring the distance between DAC and emerging donors, and the determinants of this distance, it should be possible to explore the emerging convergence or divergence of aid architecture.

To comprehensively understand the differences between emerging donors and the DAC aid model, firstly, this paper briefly reviews the relevant literature on aid models, with the particular goal of grasping what the key factors are in determining the diversity of aid models. As elements of an analytical framework, there is a focus here on recipient perceptions, learning processes, and identities and norms¹ of emerging donors. Constructivism pays particular attention to the roles of identities and norms of actors in the international community. Although influential in the analysis of international relations, constructivist theories are rarely applied to emerging economies, or more specifically emerging donors. By incorporating constructivism into the analytical framework, it is hoped that this paper will contribute to explaining why there are differences between the attitudes of emerging donors in regard to the

¹ Identities are concisely defined here as ‘collective self-image in society.’ ‘Norm’ is defined as a set of expectations on appropriate behaviors (Reilly 2012, 73). Norms also mean rules to regulate actions that are consonant with certain values supported by a specific society. They include laws, ethics, morals and customs. In short, it is a set of ‘ought tos.’ International norms are referred to as “ideas of shared expectations on appropriate behaviors of specific actors in the international community” or “codes of behaviors which are regarded as the appropriate for most of actors in the international community (Inada 2013, 19–20). Norms, at the individual level, may be reproduced through learning (socialization and sanctions) to maintain social order. This understanding is likely to be the case at the international level as well.

DAC aid model. Although conventional literature explains how emerging donors are different from the DAC aid model, this paper further argues that such differences may be created by dominant norms and identities of donors.

This paper secondly presents a brief categorization of a selection of major emerging donors based on several aid models, such as the emerging superpowers model (China and, potentially, India), the regional powers model (South Africa), and the middle powers model (Arab donors² and South Korea). These groups of donors, among other emerging donors, have particular significance not only in their unique characteristics, significant presence, and status as relatively large aid disbursements. but also in the different attitudes of three groups to the DAC aid model.³ The first group seems to be the most distant from the DAC aid model, while the last would be considered the closest, with the second thought to be intermediate in their attitudes towards DAC.

Thus, this paper thirdly explores convergence to or divergence from the DAC aid model, which is a part of the ‘international aid regime.’ However, it is unlikely that an international aid regime could ever be established globally; it is shared only in a part of the international community. Therefore, there is a boundary between *major donors* and *other donors*, each of which make, take, or even resist the aid regime. As key factors in determining difference in convergence, (1) learning of aid models by donors, (2) identities and norms of emerging donors, and (3) recipient perceptions will be discussed.

To answer the question as to why different emerging donors have kept different distances from the DAC aid model, the author has reviewed related official documents, journal articles, working papers and books. In addition, from 2007 to 2014, the author has undertaken a series of intensive interviews with aid-related stakeholders such as government officials, aid

² Arab donors include Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for their examples.

³ This paper analyses various aid models in comparison with the DAC aid model. Taiwan’s aid model can also provide a relevant perspective. For an analysis of Taiwan’s aid model, see Kondoh (2012; 2014).

agencies, NGOs, business associations, consultants, researchers and journalists in South Korea and South Africa as donor nations, and Cambodia, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Botswana and Swaziland as potential aid recipients.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Scope of Aid

OECD/DAC (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee) (2015) defines ‘official development assistance (ODA)’ as:

Grants or loans to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients (developing countries) and to multilateral agencies which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25 per cent). In addition to financial flows, technical co-operation is included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or insurance payouts) are in general not counted.

By contrast, aid has a rather broader scope. Lancaster (2007, 9–10) defines ‘aid’ as “a voluntary transfer of public resources, from a government to another independent government, to an NGO, or to an international organization ... with at least a 25 percent grant element, one goal which is to better the human condition in the country receiving the aid.”

However, ‘aid’—‘development assistance’ or ‘development co-operation,’ interchangeably—is rather difficult to define in the context of emerging donors. This is partially because different emerging donors prefer different terms (aid, development assistance or development co-operation), and also partially because their ‘aid’ is qualitatively different in

terms of its scope. As Saidi and Wolf (2011, 7) argue, the aid-like behaviors of emerging donors should be called “international development co-operation,” which blurs the boundary between trade, investment and aid in the narrow sense, as well as the boundary between public and private. For instance, even Japan in the 1960s used to choose ‘economic co-operation’ rather than ‘aid’ or ‘ODA.’ China’s definition of ‘foreign assistance’ covers everything from grants and concessional loans to commercial investments, trade-related concessional financing and even cultural exchange programs (Chin and Frolic 2007, 13). Saidi and Wolf (2011, 7) further distinguish between two different elements of international development co-operation: charity-based international development assistance and development investment/finance to promote the donor’s self-interest. In the context of emerging donors, aid or international development co-operation includes both, while greater relative emphasis is often paid to the latter. It is nonetheless difficult to set common terms on aid-like behavior. So, in this paper, regardless of the donor preference of formal terms, ‘aid’ roughly includes all activities, such as financial assistance, economic co-operation, and South-South co-operation, which the emerging donors themselves consider to be aid. This rough definition is used because emerging donors often lack a shared understanding of aid in the same sense as DAC members.

2.2 Aid Models and the International Aid Regime

Conventional literature has not necessarily offered a clear definition of aid models. This would be because major research has concentrated on aid effectiveness rather than the development of aid models. It would also be because the degree of institutionalization of aid models may differ according to individual donors and historical processes to form and transform aid systems. In this paper, ‘aid models’ refers broadly to the institutionalized orientation of the aid policies and systems that are specific to individual donors or a similar group of donors (Kondoh et al. 2010,

5).⁴ It should be noted that aid models are “never static or fixed; rather they transform dynamically according to changes in a combination of factors,” as discussed below (Kondoh et al. 2010, 14).

The aid model may not only be institutionalized locally but also internationally as part of an international aid regime. Krasner (1983) defined an international regime in general as a set of explicit and implicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures in specific areas of international relations, into which the expectations of actors converge.⁵ Hook (2008, 92) applied Krasner’s definition to that of an international aid regime: it refers to a set of aid-related principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures, in which individual aid donors and recipients should converge.⁶ Inada (2013, 9–10) further developed the understanding of international aid regime by suggesting that the international aid regime means institutions in which specific development philosophies and approaches, established by major donors, influence other donors. This functions as a means of providing the frameworks of common norms and rules, ultimately constraining other actor’s aid practices.

Key international norms on international development and aid, which underlie the international aid regime, have originated from Western communities (Rowlands 2008, 4), and they have been led primarily by international organizations such as the United Nations, World

⁴ A ‘model’ essentially facilitates understanding through a process of descriptive inference, by clipping and simplifying vague and complicated realities (Wiarda 1993). According to North (1990, 3), institutions mean rules of the game in a society; they are humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions. These institutions function as structuring incentives in political, economic and social exchanges, creating patterns of specific aid behaviors. These institutions, regardless of formal (rules) and informal (conventions and codes of behavior), constrain both international and domestic actors. It should be noted here that the notion of ‘institutions’ is wider than organizations and systems, which may be built at a more formal level.

⁵ An ‘international regime’ is constructed from elements of specified issues and areas, actors, norms and principles, rules, decision-making procedures, organizations, and behavioral patterns (Yamamoto 2008, 42–3).

⁶ As principles, developed countries should accept relief from the extreme poverty of the South as the common responsibility of the North; as rules, they also follow regulations that are concerned with the properties of official development assistance (ODA); as norms, the North should accept normative standards that are related to the quality of aid; and as decision-making procedures, donors should control and document their own ODA activities while they are also expected to share them with DAC members and accept peer reviews (Hook 2008, 92).

Bank Group and DAC. As ‘norm entrepreneurs’ that produce and disseminate new norms, they initially set different norms on development and aid through a range of annual publications. The World Bank is more concerned with economic development-related norms, indicated by its publication of the *World Development Report*, while United Nations Development Program (UNDP) focuses more on norms related to social development, through the *Human Development Report* (Inada 2013, 20, 5). Similarly, OECD/DAC has been actively committed to developing aid-related international norms for effective and appropriate aid. Originally, the Development Assistance Group, the predecessor of DAC, defined its objectives as (1) quantitatively expanding assistance to developing countries as well as promoting efficiency of assistance, (2) regularly reviewing the quantity and quality of assistance by member countries, and (3) ensuring the expansion of assistance of grants and concessional loans by their joint efforts. More recently, the Paris Declaration in 2005, which was endorsed by 91 countries and groups, and the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008, have been the most visible norms in international development and aid (Reilly 2012, 73). From these international norms developed in 2005 and 2008, DAC identified five core principles:

1. Ownership: recipient countries are supposed to develop their own national development strategies;
2. Alignment: donors support development strategies of recipient countries;
3. Harmonization: donors should streamline their efforts in recipient countries;
4. Results: development policy should have clearly-defined goals, and the progress of policy is supposed to be monitored; and
5. Mutual accountability: donors and recipients bear collective responsibility to achieve development goals (Reilly 2012, 73).

DAC, established in 1963, has been making efforts to integrate aid-related directions and procedures through the DAC New Development Strategy in 1996, Rome Declaration on Harmonization in 2003, the Memorandum of the Marrakech Roundtable on Managing for Results in 2004, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, Accra Agenda for Action in 2008, and Busan Outcome in 2011.

However, in reality, international regimes have broad variations in terms of their institutionalization level. Wallander and Keohane (2002) suggest indices of institutionalization levels of international regimes: (1) commonality to measure how much members agree on appropriate actions, (2) specificity of rules, and (3) functional differentiation. While the international regimes in the area of international economy such as GATT and IMF are highly institutionalized (Inada 2013, 10), that of aid has not been sufficiently institutionalized, since commonality is narrowly limited to DAC members. Although DAC is often assumed to be a single like-minded group with convergent interests, the standardized DAC aid model is neither unequivocally articulated nor shared. Even among DAC members, its commonality is not equally shared between US-France-Japan and UK-Netherlands-Nordic countries. In fact, according to Hook (1995) and Schraeder et al. (1998), the aid models of DAC members are diverse. While the US pursues a realistic superpower aid model that emphasizes national and global security concerns to maintain global order, Japan established a neo-mercantilist aid model under the US security umbrella that considerably liberated Japan from national security concerns in favor of regional geo-economical interests. Sweden, a middle power country, which finds neither security-based nor neo-mercantilist aid models to be affordable, has formulated a humanitarian aid model that reflects its social democrat traditions. France has built an aid model that combines economic with cultural interests to maintain its ties with former colonies (Kondoh et al. 2010, 14).⁷ Differences between DAC members occur partially because such a like-minded group is limited only to the UK, Netherlands and Nordic countries.

⁷ Summary by Kwon et al. (2006, 124–5).

It is actually this like-minded group that initiates the norm-making process in DAC while other DAC members are rather indifferent to their norms.⁸ As a result, DAC has assembled a number of aid-related norms in the form of gentlemen's agreements, through which DAC does not direct donor practices but just recommends 'best practices' (Kondoh et al. 2010, 6; Rowlands 2008, 4).

For example, DAC, based on the specific norms that it advocates, introduced a number of aid-related guidelines. It has been making an effort to share modalities-related norms such as ODA/GNP ratio, grant elements (GE), untied aid, project evaluation methods, and streamlining technical co-operation. DAC also has even been building norms on substantial aid targets like gender, environment, participatory development, democratic governance, and peace-building (Inada 2013, 111–2).⁹ Based on a number of norms, the 'DAC aid model' refers to the 'image', rather than substance, of an aid model with which donor countries are supposed to conform (Kondoh et al. 2010, 6). According to the ideal of this model, all donor countries should unify their aid programs, maintain policy coherence, and achieve harmonization of their aid policies (Potter 2008, 4).

2.3 Convergence with the DAC Aid Model

The DAC aid model has been developed as a part of an international aid regime. If the DAC aid model were to be accepted by non-DAC aid donors, it could contribute to the development of an established international aid regime. In this paper, this process is tentatively called 'convergence' with the DAC aid model. Through the convergence, more emerging donors are

⁸ In fact, DAC member countries do not share some normative recommendations such as conditionality, ODA/GNP ratio and budget support. In the cases of emerging donors, DAC donors may have different distances from the DAC aid model due to their diverse identities, norms and interests, as discussed below.

⁹ When DAC reviews the applications of non-DAC members for DAC membership accession, it evaluates the volume of aid programs, the functions of aid agencies, the quality of aid-related statistical data, and the donor's implementation of DAC recommendations (Walz and Ramachandran 2011, 10–1).

expected to accept the ‘best practices’ of aid modalities to assist in the sharing of aid targets, which are predominantly defined by DAC.

It should also be asked how the further spatial expansion of an international aid regime may or may not be promoted. That is to say, it is a question of how increased convergence may or may not be facilitated. In general, the international regime could expand through use of power (military or economic power in international relations), stakeholder interests, or non-material beliefs (values, norms, ideas, ideologies and knowledge) (Yamamoto 2008, 60). In the case of power, if an emerging donor is forced to accept the DAC aid model as a result of the use of hegemonic power by DAC members, the process of convergence will be promoted. By contrast, as Organski (1968) argues, when the power of hegemonic countries is relatively weak, countries that may be unsatisfied with the older international regime are likely to challenge the status quo and try to establish a new alternative international regime. In the case of interests, emerging donors are likely to undertake the convergence of their aid models when they find material advantages in accepting the DAC aid model, and act in a contrary manner when they cannot find any advantages. Non-DAC donors can spontaneously promote convergence when they are willing to learn and share in an understanding of aid with DAC, and *vice versa*. However, in the case of the international aid regime, the rule enforcement mechanism depends heavily on expectations or loose pressure rather than rules and sanctions against ‘deviations.’¹⁰ Thus, convergence could be often promoted by a stakeholder interests and non-material norms, while power may also be pursued in a softer manner through negotiations and persuasion.

¹⁰ In fact, DAC-defined norms are not fully and equally shared or practiced by member countries. Policy-makers of South Korea, when preparing for DAC membership in 2009, realized that they could selectively choose from DAC’s recommendations, as the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) mentioned (interview with MOSF). Even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), considered more pro-DAC, argued that it would not accept every recommendation offered by DAC’s peer review process, as other DAC members also do not (interview with MOFAT).

2.4 Why Are There Differences in Convergence?

Despite this conceptualization of a unified DAC aid model, in actuality, it continues to be more of an image of an aid model, as discussed earlier. In reality, aid models are diverse. This section focuses on why aid models converge or do not coverage with the DAC aid model. It examines several exogenous factors: (1) international political context and diplomatic strategies, (2) aid-related international pressure, and (3) the perceptions of major aid recipients, which may or may not promote convergence with an aid model. Following that, it looks at endogenous factors: (1) aid purposes, (2) the donor learning process, and (3) identities and norms.

2.4.1 Exogenous Factors

Kondoh et al. (2010) indicate that emerging donors are not only diverse in their aid models but also that their approaches to the DAC aid model also differ. In fact, while an emerging superpower like China takes a minimalist approach to shortening its distance from the DAC aid model, middle powers, including South Korea, are approaching convergence with the DAC aid model, as discussed in the third section.

So why is it that at least some of these emerging donors seem committed to convergence? Supporters of the globalization thesis would argue that the end of the Cold War and the subsequent globalization process has decreased the options available to emerging donors. According to this thesis, developing countries may have followed a variety of paths towards democracy, authoritarianism, totalitarianism, revolution, corporatism, or civil war in the 1960s and 1970s (Wiarda 1993). Now, however, countries are allowed to choose from a single option: that of liberal democracy and market economy, as Fukuyama (1992) indicated in the 'End of History.' It could be argued that this convergence to a single model also occurs with aid models. However, this globalization thesis, with its rather passive understanding of aid model convergence, requires further examination. Exogenous factors such as the end of Cold

War and extension of globalization cannot fully explain why some donors among the emerging donors are indifferent to the DAC aid model, while the others such as South Korea are approaching or converging toward it with the explicit objective of gaining DAC membership.

So, firstly, international political context and diplomatic strategies have a very significant impact on donor determinations of whether, how and why they should be engaged in aid-giving activities. These contextual factors reference a broad international background in which aid donors are embedded. For instance, the bipolar Cold War regime provided an incentive to build a third alternative to bipolar power, the Non-Alignment Movement. The assistance provided by China and India to other countries during the Cold War was motivated within the context of this Non-Alignment Movement. The diplomatic strategies of individual donors in international politics, such as geo-political interests, political relations with neighboring countries, and status in the international community also matter in the choice of aid models (Kondoh et al. 2010, 13). Donors may choose their aid models by differentiating themselves from the aid models of their rivals, and some donors may gravitate their aid models towards the DAC aid model in order to present themselves as mature donors. The different international political context and diplomatic strategies may thus differentiate the response of donors to convergence.

Secondly, aid-related international pressure, particularly from DAC, works to shape aid practices. DAC attitudes toward emerging donors and its current push for aid effectiveness are illustrative of these pressures, but they do also include certain international conditions. These are felt by donors in the form of pressure from the international community, such as aid competition with rival donors (Kondoh et al. 2010, 13). If emerging donors feel they are under enormous pressure from DAC or rival donors, it may put pressure on them to adopt the DAC aid model.

Thirdly, the perceptions of major recipients of aid from emerging donors may guide the behaviors of the donors. For instance, if major recipients prefer the norms, modalities,

schemes, and procedures of the DAC aid model, their preferences are likely to be one of the factors that indirectly urge emerging donors to incorporate the DAC aid model. By contrast, if they are unable to find any relevance in the DAC aid model in their development goals, and if they find non-DAC aid to be more attractive and ‘effective enough’,¹¹ the customer’s voice is likely to contribute to divergence of aid models from the DAC aid model. The perceptions of major recipients are rather new among analytical perspectives but they are significant in terms of a constructivist understanding of the international aid regime. Therefore, this paper ensures that proper attention is paid to the potential influences of the recipient’s perceptions on convergence process.

2.4.2 Endogenous Factors

Although exogenous factors may certainly influence the donor’s choice of aid model, endogenous factors can play a critical role in translating them into domestic responses. As Lancaster (2007, 9) argues, aid policies are influenced not only by international factors but also by domestic ones, since domestic politics play a key role in mediating international and domestic interests. This is the case if the different domestic responses of donors to other similar international factors are considered.¹² Hence this paper places particular emphasis on the roles of endogenous factors in convergence.

Firstly, as Lancaster (2007, 4–5, 13–7) points out, diverse aid purposes, such as diplomatic, development, humanitarian, commercial¹³ and cultural purposes, may define the aid model. Although the DAC aid model is designed to pursue development and humanitarian

¹¹ In ‘effective enough’ aid, emerging donors only partially introduce the norms of the DAC aid model but their approaches to the development of recipients are effective enough.

¹² For instance, attitudes to the DAC aid model may differ despite similar DAC pressures.

¹³ If the economic interdependence of donors is high, it may intensify competition among donors for recipient resources and/or markets. Aid might be utilized to boost the competitiveness of donors, a practice illustrated by recent instances of resource diplomacy packaged as aid schemes. Trade-dependency may have an impact on the weight of commercial interests in aid. In particular, if a donor country is without resources, aid could be used as an instrument to secure stability in its economic activities, and if the economy is based on active export performance, aid can be used to secure export market exclusivity (Kondoh et al. 2010, 13).

interests in developing countries, it should be noted here that no donor country pursues a single aid purpose. In reality, donors combine purposes, although the relative weights of each combination might differ. Aid purpose is always a combination of the *relative balance* of several different purposes. Furthermore, the combination of aid purposes of any given donor is not fixed; rather, donors change the relative balance over time (Kondoh et al. 2010, 8).

Dominant aid purposes of emerging donors, however, could not sufficiently explain why and how some donors such as South Korea transform their aid model toward basic acceptance of the DAC aid model even though its diplomatic and commercial interests do not seem to have changed. Thus, secondly, this paper focuses on learning the process emerging donors use to develop their aid models. An emerging donor's learning process might result in a diversification of their attitudes away from the established international aid regime. The impact of exogenous factors such as globalization is not a given; rather it can be differently translated into individual domestic responses. For example, when the international context changes, emerging donors can establish or innovate their aid models to maximize their advantage. However, the establishment or innovation of aid models is not as simple as imagined.¹⁴ And it is rare that donors undertake the establishment and innovation of aid models without preconceived ideas. Similar to the idea by Amsden (1989), who argues that late-industrializers compressed their industrialization process by learning from earlier industrializers, emerging donors can pursue a more efficient model construction process by learning from the traditional and non-traditional donors.

It should be noted that the lessons can be drawn from both positive and negative outcomes: new donors may learn positively from the successful lessons as well negatively from the failures of other donors. No learning process is constant, but it is particularly crucial and intense in the institutionalization and re-institutionalization process of aid models. Once

¹⁴ This is also because, as Pierson (2004) argues, once a specific path is fixed, the self-reinforcement process makes it difficult to divert to a new path (path-dependency).

specific aid models are institutionalized under stable domestic and international circumstances, the intensity of learning is likely to decrease and emerging donors are able to manage their aid practices through inertia.

Yet it is not clear why different aid donors select different aid models as their learning models. Thus, thirdly, in keeping with constructivism, this paper suggests that non-material elements such as values, norms, identities, ideas and ideologies,¹⁵ which are internalized in emerging donors and their major actors, have particular importance in shaping the attitudes of donors with regard to convergence. The roles of norms and identities are increasingly significant in defining donor attitudes to convergence. For example, while South Korea still maintains traditional commercial interests in its foreign policy, it is gradually reducing its overt commercial interests and drastically promoting convergence. Korea's rather contradictory choice of convergence, in addition to its commercialism in aid, cannot be convincingly explained by a traditional interest-based account. As Lumsdaine (1993) argues, it is a non-material element, "moral vision," that determines the direction of aid. Hence the analysis requires non-material elements beyond economic interests.¹⁶

The significance of international norms and identities, which are shared by major actors in the international community, has been the focus of constructivism. Constructivism maintains that once norms and identities are institutionalized and internalized, they may not only constrain certain inappropriate behaviors but also promote the desirable practices of actors (Oyane 2013, 10–1). When norms and identities in the international community become

¹⁵ Hereafter, this paper will refer to these as 'norms and identities.' Both norms and identities are non-material elements; yet they seem to work differently with regard to convergence. Identities may guide the process of norm choice; while middle-power identities seem to prefer taking internationally established norms, superpower identities do not reject the building of alternative norms. As regards ideologies, Noël and Thérien (1995, 523, 6) further stress that just as differently institutionalized political ideologies and values can create a variety of domestic welfare regimes among countries, variation in welfare regimes can translate into variations in aid regimes among donors.

¹⁶ Nonetheless, and rather contrary to this, donor's interests may determine specific norms. For example, Nordic aid, despite its small volume, still advances donor interests in the international community by advocating humanitarian norms.

comprehensive and dominant, and when they are internalized into most actors, such a set of norms functions as an international regime, promoting convergence.

These norms and identities are not only limited to DAC but also shared by individual donor countries. Diverse norms and identities are internalized by different individuals, groups and organizations in donor countries. Through competition and the relative power balance that forms among them as a consequence, specific norms and identities of donors can be determined.¹⁷ These actors might in principle include politicians and bureaucrats – particularly of foreign and economic ministries – as well as aid agencies, business, tax-payers and interest groups such as aid-related companies and civil society (Kondoh et al. 2010, 11). Civil society, including NGOs, tends to play a particularly significant role as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Yamamoto 2008, 99). As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) suggest, norms have a kind of lifecycle of ‘norm-emergence’ (NGOs often raise alternative, and often ‘universal,’ norms), then there is a ‘norm cascade’ (such norms are dispersed to other actors), and finally an ‘internalization’ of norms to most actors. However, in the case of emerging donors, political space for civil society is often limited, and instead, conservative political elites often have predominant power in determining the norms and ideologies of donors, lowering the level of convergence. In particular, competition between the foreign ministry, which may often share international aid norms, and the economic ministry, a body more oriented to economically defined national interests, could be one of the determinants on norms of individual donors as a whole. The coalition among stakeholders also matters with convergence. If the strongest possible coalition prefers advocacy-oriented civil society to economic concerns, the relative power balance of political actors will favor more humanitarian norms of aid; consequently

¹⁷ This implies that competition and balance among diverse norms and identities may not result in monolithic norms and identities but create multilayered norms and identities. For instance, even if Japan and South Korea accept the norms of the DAC aid model, they might also be embedded in identities of Asian industrializers, which have a distinct experiences and philosophy from the ‘West.’

promoting convergence. By contrast, if the economic ministry aligns with the business sector,¹⁸ this may result in conservative commercialist aid practices. Thus, when norms and identities of emerging donors are examined, attention should be paid to the relative power balance and coalitions of domestic political actors.


As expected, however, there might be some gaps between the international norms on aid practices and those of emerging donors. That is, the divergent attitudes of emerging donors to the established international aid regime differ according to the norms and identities within those donors, in which the donors understand how and what roles they should play in the international community. Reilly (2012, 72) argues that there are two approaches to international norms. Firstly, a norm-taker approach refers to donors that accept or do not contend against major international norms. Secondly, a norm-maker approach is to promote an alternative set of norms derived from its own experiences and ideologies of actors. Certainly, a country with a superpower identity would be ready to build a certain international order as a norm-maker as a result of the consequent heavy financial burden.¹⁹ In the case of emerging donors, emerging superpowers (such as China in recent times and India probably in the future) might select, lead or ultimately challenge an established international aid regime and subsequently build alternative international or regional aid regimes.²⁰ By contrast, South Korea, seemingly identifying itself as a middle power, would be more likely to basically comply with the established international aid regime of the DAC aid model as a norm-taker, rather than create an alternative aid regime.

¹⁸ Certainly even some business sectors may recently have an affinity with some of international aid norms by paying attention to their corporate social responsibility (CSR). However, this would be the case basically in DAC member countries.

¹⁹ As regards maintaining such an international order, which has been built and maintained by a superpower like the US, order, peace, the free trade system, and a key currency are typical examples of Pax-Americana (Inada 2013, 6). The provision and maintenance of such 'international public goods' is very costly; therefore only superpowers with huge financial capacity are eligible. Only superpowers may find an incentive to bear such a huge financial burden as the proof of their leadership in the international community.

²⁰ The plan to build the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Bank could be an example of this.

Figure 1 illustrates the analytical framework on the determinants of convergence of aid models. This figure indicates that individual aid models of donors are formulated by diverse exogenous and endogenous factors. Different composition of factors may determine the different levels of convergence of their aid models from the DAC aid model.



3. Universalization or Relativization of the DAC Aid Model

This section outlines the characteristics of three groups of emerging donors. In doing so, historical evolution, major aid policies and their priorities, as well as aid systems are analyzed. If the analysis can find characteristics of each group that are similar to the DAC aid model, for instance, priorities toward the social sectors, alignment with international initiatives like the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), partnership with international community, or consolidated aid systems, it may be considered a benchmark for convergence.

3.1 Emerging Superpower Aid Model

3.1.1 Chinese Aid

Chinese aid has a long history and it has evolved dynamically. From independence in 1949 to the 1970s, Chinese aid was motivated by South-South solidarity, membership of the Non-Alignment Movement and diplomatic competition with Taiwan, all of these motivations were clearly ideological and political (Potter 2008, 10; Rowlands 2008, 6).²¹ This politically motivated and costly aid was revised upon the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976. From the 1980s, China had been preparing for globalization and World Trade Organization (WTO) membership by ‘Go Global’ (*Zou Chuqu*): establishing brand names of competitive Chinese multilateral enterprises, promoting joint ventures with state-owned enterprises and foreign capital, promoting active foreign direct investment (FDI) and mergers by Chinese companies, and urging Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises to enter the lower end markets. In the 1990s, a series of institutional reforms for active aid were introduced, and the China Export Import Bank was established to offer concessional loans mainly geared towards the infrastructure and energy sectors in developing countries (Brautigam 2009, 74, 79–80). Recent Chinese aid has been allocated to Asia (about 40 percent), Africa (25 percent), and Latin America (13 percent) (Chin and Frolic 2007, 12–3).

Chinese aid policy has maintained its distance from the DAC aid model. It has been governed by the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the Eight Principles for China’s Aid to Third World Countries (Brautigam 2009, 30; Chin and Frolic 2007, 5). For instance, Chinese aid is based on the ‘win-win’ principle of securing China’s economic development by reinforcing a bilateral relationship of trade and investment, as well as by linking its tied aid with Chinese strategies for ‘Go Global’ and natural resources (Inada 2013, 130). Positive views evaluate the contributions of Chinese aid to industrialization and employment generation in

²¹ Chinese aid was initially influenced by communist internationalism. Yet, as Sino-Soviet relations worsened in the 1950s and 1960s, China found its interests lay in its leadership role in the Non-Alignment Movement (Chin and Frolic 2007, 5).

recipients. As Moyo (2010) argues, aid alone is not sufficient for development; aid should be accompanied by active FDI for export growth. This rather economy-centered understanding of development contrasts with the current development discourse in favor of humanitarian assistance and social development among the DAC member countries. Thus the so-called ‘Beijing Consensus’, advocating government-led development, the non-interference in internal affairs of recipient countries, active utilization of FDI and loans, and heavy attention to trade and industrialization, is strikingly different from the dominant norms of the established countries, such as the Washington Consensus, which has been vocal about democratization, economic liberalization, deregulation and privatization (Inada 2013, 130–1).²²

3.1.2 The Indian Aid Model

India has been an old donor like China. From the 1950s, it started providing assistance to neighboring countries as a means of asserting its regional hegemony (Rowlands 2008, 6; Kragelund 2008, 574). From the 1960s, Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) was established to provide grant and technical co-operation to other regions with the motivation of promoting the South-South solidarity of the Non-Alignment Movement as well as a rivalry with China.

From the 1990s, Indian aid has experienced a thorough transformation. As a consolidated aid agency, the India International Development Cooperation Agency (IIDCA), later renamed the Development Partnership Administration (DPA), was finally created in 2012. It maintains grant and technical co-operation to neighboring countries with the Indian version of Monroe Doctrine (Kondoh et al. 2010, 36). India also offers concessional loans to neighboring countries – with the goal of better integration of the regional economy, India has been assisting in the development of the transportation sector of Bangladesh (Interview with the Indian High Commission in Bangladesh). In addition, India actively utilizes concessional

²² It is certainly true that the Chinese government officially rejects the externally formulated ‘Beijing Consensus,’ however its actual behaviors are not so persuasive to reject it.

loans to other recipients. In competition with China for minerals and markets, India is increasing its focus on Africa; 61 percent of loans through the Indian Exim Bank in 2009 were allocated to African recipients (Saidi and Wolf 2011, 19); and India hosted the first India-Africa Forum in 2008 (Chaturvedi 2012, 175–6).

India has deepened its confidence in its ability to play a more active global role, with accumulated foreign currency reserves growing from US\$5.8 billion in 1991 to US\$297 billion in 2010 (Chaturvedi 2012, 169). India is also attempting to graduate from being an aid recipient to gaining permanent membership of the UN Security Council, and it has become eager to secure export markets through provision of aid (Kragelund 2008, 574). As Raja Mohan (2003) showed in his analysis of the transformation of India’s diplomacy in the 1990s, it has changed its diplomatic approach from socialist to capitalist, it also shifted its interests from global political considerations to economic priorities. India has consequently changed its philosophy from one of idealistic solidarity with the Third World to self-interested pragmatism (Chaturvedi 2012, 170).

3.2 Southern Hybrid Aid Model: South African Aid

South Africa is one of the emerging middle powers in the South.²³ It has recently advocated South-South co-operation. UNCTAD (2006) defines South-South co-operation as “economic and technical co-operation among developing countries in trade, investment and finance.” South-South co-operation is referred to as the wide-ranging exchanges of resources, technologies, skills and technical know-how among the Southern Nations to promote development (Besharati 2013, 36). This emphasis, particularly towards the productive sectors, is different from the recent development discourses where the focus is on social sectors (Walz and Ramachandran 2011, 17).

²³ Rowlands (2008, 17) defines South Africa and Brazil as smaller and more regionally focused emerging donors.

South Africa has a long but complex history as a donor. It started its aid program for other countries under the apartheid regime. The aid policy under apartheid was heavily influenced by the political motivations of South Africa. Before the apartheid regime was abolished in 1994, South Africa was sanctioned by the international community. While the State Security Council of South Africa, independent of the foreign ministry, pursued a military approach to the pro-African National Congress (ANC) and neighboring majority-ruled countries (Alden and le Pere 2003, 11–2), it also assisted Lesotho, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Comoro and Paraguay in order to cultivate their diplomatic support for South Africa (Sidiropoulos 2012, 220).²⁴

With the end of the apartheid regime, the new South Africa thoroughly changed its approach to aid. South Africa established the African Renaissance Fund (ARF) under the Department of Foreign Affairs in 2000 as the most systematically institutionalized aid agency. Replacing the apartheid-era Economic Co-operation Promotion Loan Fund, the ARF was designed to become an instrument for promoting the international goals of South Africa. The establishment of ARF was based on Thabo Mbeki’s concept of an Africa Renaissance Spirit, which strongly supported partnership and solidarity among African nations. The ARF had a mandate to offer funds comprehensively and provide assistance in advancing democracy, good governance, conflict resolution, socio-economic development, humanitarian disaster relief, technical co-operation and capacity development (Besharati 2013, 19). However, the ARF was strongly criticized by opposition parties in 2010. It was argued that the ARF was not properly monitored, and consequently it propped up rogue states that violated human rights (Guinea and Zimbabwe), and even assisted with non-developmental projects such as the African Cup of Nations in Mali in 2002 (Sidiropoulos 2012, 227–30).

²⁴ Aid to deal with diplomatic isolation/competition can be seen in Korean aid until the 1970s and Taiwan’s aid up until the present. Through the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), South Africa also provided ‘international’ aid to pseudo self-governing black territories (described as ‘homelands’ or ‘Bantustans’), which only South Africa recognized as legitimate and independent states (Besharati 2013, 17).

In 2007, the ruling ANC discussed the introduction of a new agency, which would cover poverty reduction in all countries on the African continent. It was decided to establish a new agency to streamline and co-ordinate aid activities in a coherent manner and to double its aid volume (Besharati 2013, 34). The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) drafted the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) bill, which was approved in December 2012. Accordingly, SADPA was formally established in June 2013 as a new agency for development co-operation from South Africa. The vision of SADPA is “to develop partnerships that drive innovation around development cooperation in Africa and developing countries to create self-sufficient societies” (Casoo 2012). One of the key strategies of SADPA is to ensure co-crafting of the policy focus. This meant that SADPA would be operated in a demand-driven manner. SADPA also prioritizes African countries as recipients. It should be noted that SADPA, as typically seen in South-South co-operation models, emphasizes common interests and mutual benefits among recipients and South Africa (Casoo 2012; Interview with DIRCO).

Although SADPA may potentially cover a wide-range of aid schemes, its financial constraints and division of labor with other aid-related line ministries and provinces²⁵ have substantially limited the scope of operations for SADPA; SADPA would be obliged to specialize as a body for grants and technical co-operation (Besharati 2013, 54).²⁶ In South Africa, with its decentralized administrative structure, at least four departments, including the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, National Treasury, Trade and Industry and Presidency, play significant roles in aid. Other departments, including justice, defence (PKO),²⁷ police, education (scholarship program), energy, agriculture, public entities, as well

²⁵ It is said that most of the provinces in South Africa are involved in international aid activities (Interview with DIRCO).

²⁶ For instance, Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) would continue to offer the largest loan schemes, even after the establishment of SADPA.

²⁷ Since South Africa recognizes that regional stability is significant to South Africa itself, and that peace and security are preconditions for development, more than half of South African aid is allocated to the defence and security sector (Rowlands 2008, 8).

as science and technology, are not negligible players in South African aid. Even most of provinces have their own incentives to engage in international operations, which are funded by donors (Besharati 2013, 31, 45, 7).²⁸

Despite the difficulties, the aid burden of South Africa seems heavy. The ODA/GNI ratio is estimated to be as high as 0.7–1.0 percent. However, it is very arguable as to whether or not aid by South Africa fits with the DAC-defined ODA concept (Besharati 2013, 32). This is because assistance by South Africa includes wider efforts, such as peace-building, debt cancellation, non-concessional loans to infrastructure development, *de facto* ‘budget support’ by the revenue from customs duty tariffs, and some training, scholarships and technical co-operation (Besharati 2013, 36). If transfers through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and Common Monetary Area (CMA) as well as assistance by the defence ministry are excluded and if DAC standards are applied, other estimates have indicated the aid volume of South Africa in the 2000s was US\$280 million, equivalent to 0.17 percent of ODA/GNI (Rowlands 2008, 12).

Although South Africa generally complies with the DAC aid model, advocating the Paris Declaration and good governance assistance, South Africa is neither a member of DAC at the moment nor a sophisticated donor that has an aid-related database or project evaluation frameworks – it is rather at just an initial stage of convergence (interview with DIRCO). South African aid does not renounce its own uniqueness – it has repeatedly emphasized its solidarity and partnership with Africa,²⁹ and very carefully claims respect the national ownership of recipients. The experiences of democratization and the priority placed on good governance are rather similar between DAC members. However the Government of South Africa seems to be

²⁸ The decentralized aid mechanism is the case with aid provision as well. For instance, it was estimated that the aid volume of the ARF covered just 3–4 percent of the total aid volume of South Africa (Besharati 2013, 19).

²⁹ At least officially but arguably, the Government of South Africa denies its interest in DAC membership. What is interesting is that, through a number of channels, South Africa has been active in developing an ‘African Consensus’ at Busan High-Level Forum (Besharati 2013, 21). The African Consensus, unlike either the Washington Consensus nor the Beijing Consensus, welcomes South-South co-operation and emerging donors to supplement North-South Relations.

reluctant to unilaterally impose political conditionality on democratization and human rights.³⁰ In addition, the aid of South Africa is imbued with various political and economic interests in order to harmonize domestic development needs and external assistance (Besharati 2013, 58).

As regards its political interests, South Africa has been actively engaged in multilateral organizations for its political strategies. For example, South Africa has been reinforcing the African Union (AU) as its main channel for multilateral security, development and political decision-making in Africa. In fact, since the foundation of the AU, the Government of South Africa has remained in the top five largest contributors to the budget of the AU³¹ as well as one of the few countries that pay their subscription punctually. South Africa also hosted the AU's Pan African Parliament in Midrand, South Africa. And a former foreign minister of South Africa became a candidate for the Chairperson of AU in 2012. Similarly, South Africa has been vigorously committed to the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Among 15 member countries, South Africa is the biggest contributor to offer 20 percent of the operations budget of SADC. It also chaired political, defence and security organs of SADC between 2009 and 2010 as well as playing active roles in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan of SADC (Besharati 2013, 22). South Africa's political engagement on the African Continent is very evident, with the mediation of the ceasefire in Côte d'Ivoire as an example (Sidiropoulos 2012, 217).

As regards economic interests, although the aid of South Africa, particularly assistance by SADPA, claims to formally pay little attention to its commercial interests (Interview with DIRCO), it seems misleading that South Africa does not attach any economic interests to its aid. Rather, economic interests in aid are increasing. Since regionally embedded South Africa could secure its economic interests through further regional integration, aid is also used to

³⁰ DIRCO, at the interview in 2013, mentions that issues of human rights and democratization in recipient countries are *scopes* of aid, not *conditions* of aid. There is an exceptional case as well. The South Africa conditioned good governance reform in exchange of loan requested by the Government of Swaziland in 2011.

³¹ South Africa contributes 150–200 million rand annually. This contribution is equivalent to about 15 percent of the annual budget of the AU (Besharati 2013, 22).

promote regional integration for donor economic interests. South Africa's 1996 economic development plan was called the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), which replaced the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), shifted attention from basic human needs (BHN) to neo-liberal economic growth (Alden et al. 2003, 28). In 1999, the foreign ministry redefined its mission as 'security and wealth creation.'

South Africa has a number of channels with which to advance its economic interests in the African continent. In 2010 the Economic Development Department indicated that assistance to regional growth is not only an act of solidarity but also an instrument to ensure economic opportunities for South Africa (Besharati 2013, 24). The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) also co-ordinates international co-operation programs through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). SACU, comprised of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, imposes customs and tariffs on trade with countries outside of the region. Customs and tariffs are pooled and distributed to member countries. For member countries apart from South Africa, the revenue from SACU is very crucial: it is equivalent to 20–70 percent of national revenue. The revenue from SACU is similar to general budget support, or a form of *de facto* aid from South Africa to neighboring countries (Sidiropoulos 2012, 224–5). In addition, unlike other developing countries with their massive inflow of Chinese products, the markets of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) are dominated by products from South Africa, largely due to protection by SACU.³² Furthermore, South Africa has established regional development financial institutions, such as the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and DBSA. While IDC offers finance to promote industrialization in Southern Africa, DBSA is a state-owned financial institution that offers a sizeable amount of finance for infrastructure development in the SADC member countries.³³

³² SACU has already ensured the markets of BLNS for South Africa; therefore SADPA could concentrate on aid for solidarity rather than for commercialism.

³³ The total amount of loans of DBSA is more than 10 billion rand (Besharati 2013, 44). One-third of projects of DBSA are distributed in sectors such as infrastructure, energy, telecommunications, mining, transportation, water, manufacturing and health (Sidiropoulos 2012, 231–2).

South Africa was one of the co-founders of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001, being the biggest contributor, and hosting the NEPAD secretariat in South Africa (Besharati 2013, 20–1). In short, the assistance by South Africa, particularly by SADPA, seems to have its primary purpose in building solidarity with other African countries. However, aid, in a broader sense, is linked with the economic and commercial interests of South Africa, although such linkages might not explicitly discriminate between non-South African and South African companies.

Kobayashi (2013, 249) suggests that South Africa may have a hybrid aid model, which combines South-South co-operation and DAC-like ODA. Perhaps SADPA, among the other aid-related organizations of South Africa, would be closer to the DAC aid model, because its economic interests have already been secured by SACU and DBSA. At the same time, South Africa's aid model has a unique emphasis towards aid by Africa for Africa. By mixing both, South Africa is creating a Southern hybrid aid model.

3.3 Islamic Aid Model: Arab Aid

As already been pointed out, Arab donors have a long history of aid giving, and some of the most established and generous aid programs (Walz and Ramachandran 2011, 11). Kuwait established the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development in 1961, followed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development in 1971 and Saudi Arabia with the Saudi Fund for Development in 1974. The aid volume of Arab donors from 1973 to 2008 reached 19 percent of the total of DAC, occupying approximately 75 percent of non-DAC aid volume. The average ODA/GNI ratio of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait between 1973 to 2008 was as high as 1.5 percent (Walz and Ramachandran 2011, 3–4, 11–2).

The Arab aid model has distinct features in comparison with the DAC aid model. Arab aid is rather politically motivated: aid is designed to strengthen Islamic solidarity. Their main recipients are thus concentrated heavily among other Arab states, reflecting Islamic solidarity

and religious ties. While 75 percent of assistance is concentrated on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Arab donors have increased their assistance to low-income countries (LICs) in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over the last decade due to their objectives of promoting Afro-Arab unity (Walz and Ramachandran. 2011, 12–3). Arab aid is also different from the DAC aid model in terms of its emphasis on project aid via concessional loans, although aid is not specifically tied to the donor’s commercial interests but motivated by a charity rationale (Kragelund 2008, 565, 7; Saidi and Wolf 2011, 22). The sectoral priorities of the Islamic aid model are to promote infrastructure development, in areas such as transportation, energy and water (Walz and Ramachandran 2011, 13–4).

What is most unique about Arab aid is that they have developed their own multilateral institutions: the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development houses the Coordination Group to co-finance certain aid projects. It also co-ordinates aid actions and shares ‘best practices’ among Arab donors to promote regional integration and socio-economic development (Saidi and Wolf 2011, 22; Walz and Ramachandran 2011, 12). This Coordination Group among Arab donors functions in a similar manner to DAC. Arab donors have also established the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), the largest aid agency among Arab donors. The IDB provides loans that are compatible with Sharia. They have developed common procedures on procurement and disbursement, which are determined by the Arab Coordination Group’s Procurement Guidelines (Walz and Ramachandran 2011, 13).

Despite the distinctiveness of Arab donors, they also show convergence with the DAC aid model, particularly in terms of aid procedures and humanitarian norms. Arab donors have close relations with DAC and have maintained annual consultations with DAC. While not actually members, they provide annual reports on their aid activities to DAC (Rowlands 2008, 17). UAE and Kuwait have also adopted the DAC definition of ODA and report their volume of aid disbursement (Manning 2006, 3; Saidi and Wolf 2011, 23). In addition, in the area of international humanitarian assistance, Arab donors are approaching convergence with the

international aid regime. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) introduced the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHDI). UAE has even established a number of interactive channels with traditional donors and multilateral organizations for humanitarian assistance. It launched the Global Humanitarian Appeal in 2009 and proactively participated in setting up international humanitarian agendas by organizing annual meetings for humanitarian aid, such as the Dubai International Humanitarian Aid and Development Conference and Exhibition (DIHAD). It also joined the OCHA Donor Support Group in 2006 as well as the UNHCR Donor Support Group in 2009 as the only non-Western Islamic donor. Arab donors have also continued to strengthen their relationship with international humanitarian organizations such as the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) (Binder et al. 2010, 8). Thus, Arab donors have certainly consolidated their own aid model, in which their Islamic identities are reflected in their aid philosophy and distribution, while it is clear that they also respect the DAC aid model.

3.4 The Asian DAC Aid Model: South Korea's Aid

As a result of diplomatic competition with North Korea, South Korea started giving aid from 1963.³⁴ Aid was used as a diplomatic instrument to cultivate diplomatic ties to prove that the South was the legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula (Kim 2008, 3).

In the 1980s, South Korea strengthened its presence in the international community. South Korea hosted the Asian Games in 1986 and the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988. It has emerged as one of the newly industrializing economies (NIEs), economically overwhelming the North. Both the South and the North joined the UN in 1991. South Korea's successful economic development had multiple impacts: it weakened the importance of diplomatic

³⁴ Diplomatic competition in the cold war was also the purpose of aid offered by Taiwan.

interests in aid policy and it further increased its trade dependency; moreover, the OECD was seeking greater burden-sharing of aid from South Korea (Kondoh 2013, 136–7). Accordingly, South Korea expanded its aid activities for economic purposes. In 1987, the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) was established to provide concessional loans, and in 1991, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) was also founded for the provisions of grants and technical co-operation.

From 2000, Presidents Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-hyun further expanded aid volume quantitatively and reformed aid practices qualitatively. In terms of aid purposes, ‘universal values and norms’, such as democracy, human rights, and humanitarianism, have been frequently advocated. In the Vision 2030, formulated in 2006, South Korea declared its compliance with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and other DAC guidelines. Untied aid has become one of the focal points of Korean aid reform. Furthermore, the aid system has been upgraded, and the Basic Law on International Development Cooperation, incorporating aid philosophy, agendas, and strategies, was enacted in 2009 (Kim 2010, 12). What is the obvious is Korea’s strong commitment to building a partnership with the international community. Indeed, in 2005, South Korea was the only non-DAC member that signed the Paris Declaration as a donor (MOFAT 2008, 10). South Korea participated in the Accra High Level Forum, and then was the host country for the Busan High Level Forum in 2011. Following a series of aid reforms, South Korea was finally admitted to DAC in 2010.

It is certainly true, however, that South Korea does not fully converge with the DAC aid model. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)³⁵ and KOICA follow mainstream development discourses in relation to social development, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) and EDCF argue the significance of economic development through concessional loans for infrastructure development. MOSF-EDCF have put considerable emphasis on economic considerations in aid allocation. Although the share of Korean exports to developing

³⁵ It was called the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) until 2013.

countries was 24.2 per cent in 1988, these had increased to 55.9 per cent by 1997. To strengthen trade partnerships with developing countries, loan schemes of EDCF were allocated to Korean companies to promote their participation in economic co-operation (Kondoh 2013, 137). The Korean ODA model, based on Korean economic development experiences, has been conceptualized by the MOSF-led knowledge-sharing program (KSP). However, the Korean ODA Model does not take Korean aid far away from the DAC aid model. As EDCF (2013, 22–3) indicates, the Korean ODA model can be fully customized according to the diverse contexts of recipients and international regulations.

In sum, South Korea adjusted its aid model toward that of the DAC aid model in order to gain DAC membership in 2010.³⁶ Yet, this does not mean that South Korea's aid model has completely converged with the DAC aid model. Rather some philosophies and practices as an Asian donor persist in its emphasis on project aid by loan schemes to economic sectors. South Korea, like Japan, illustrates the Asian version of the DAC aid model, by mixing the DAC aid model and its own traditional aid model.³⁷

4. Why Does Convergence Differ Between Countries?

The second section showed that the DAC aid model exists at a conceptual level and does not exist in the real world. Rather, most donors have created diverse aid models by mixing different aid models. While China and India keep their distance from the DAC aid model, South Africa has introduced the DAC aid model to some extent. Arab donors have maintained a good relationship with DAC, and South Korea became a DAC member in 2010. Yet it is not clear why the level of convergence differs between different donors. This paper suggests that

³⁶ Certainly, the diplomacy of South Korea often emphasizes its 'bridging role' in international relations. However, such an 'aspiration,' in which South Korea *should* play a bridging role, is not same as the reality in which South Korea actually *does*.

³⁷ It has been pointed out that Thailand is interested in gaining DAC membership. The Thaksin administration declared that Thailand has become an emerging donor that could contribute to the achievement of MDGs (Potter 2008, 5–6).

the different level of convergence can be explained particularly by (1) the donor learning processes, (2) donor identities and norms, and (3) recipient factors.

4.1 Convergence and Divergence by Emerging Donors

4.1.1 Learning Process

As briefly discussed in the literature review, the institutionalization and re-institutionalization of aid models is often accompanied by a process of learning about other aid models. Although the learning process of the Arab aid model has not been clearly documented, that of Chinese aid has been fairly closely analyzed.

Brautigam (2009, 56) points out that the Chinese aid model, which utilizes loans heavily for infrastructure, was derived from its experiences of receiving assistance from Japan and its drawing lessons from Japan's engagement with ASEAN.³⁸ Although the emphasis on a 'win-win' approach sounds like the typical approach of emerging donors, it was however, an approach of the Japanese aid policy in East and Southeast Asia during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1987, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) published the New Asia Industries Development Plan (New AID Plan), which packaged the trinity of aid-investment-trade. China 'recycled' it in Africa (Saidi and Wolf 2011, 8, 14). As Zhou Baogen, a Chinese economist in the Ministry of Commerce, argued, since the trinity of trade-investment-aid promoted the economic development of Japan and its recipients, including China, aid by China should pursue the idea of Grand Aid (*Da Yuanzhu*) for win-win (Shimomura 2013, 181). The uniqueness of Japanese aid—loans in the infrastructure sector to invite FDI from Japan, and repayment of loans by means of mineral exports—are hence reflected in the current Chinese aid policies.³⁹

³⁸ For further details, see also Shimomura and Ping (2015).

³⁹ Suzuki (2013, 258–9) concludes that China has actually been eager to learn from the experiences of other donors in building and rebuilding the Chinese aid model; in particular, China has appreciated (1) Japanese experiences of public relations to mobilize national support, and (2) Japanese organizational reform in relation to the integration of aid agencies.

The learning process of South Korea has also been well documented. Kim and Seddon (2005, 161, 3) concluded that, since the socio-economic conditions of South Korea in the mid-1980s were thought to be similar to those of Japan in the mid-1960s, and as South Korea lacked relative experience as a donor, Korean policy-makers suggested that South Korea should follow the path utilized by the Japanese government, by explicitly modeling aid approaches, systems and procedures on the Japanese aid model. It is therefore natural for Korean policy-makers to frequently refer to the Japanese precedent when they meet the unprecedented: preparation for DAC entry, for instance⁴⁰ (Kondoh 2013, 144–5).

A number of Korean policy-makers frankly admit that they spontaneously learnt and even ‘copied’ from the Japanese aid system (Interview with KOICA). For instance, JICA’s aid system has provided a benchmark for KOICA: when KOICA formulated its laws and regulations, those of JICA were translated into Korean; and even counterparts in developing countries perceived KOICA as the ‘Korean JICA’ (Lee 2003, 145–6; Kim and Seddon 2005, 170).⁴¹ This self-learning process seems to be still ongoing: when KOICA is preparing more sophisticated procurement and environment guidelines, it does research on the Japanese approaches in the same areas (Interview with KOICA) (Kondoh 2013, 143).

Japan has even assisted Korea with the process of learning about aid practices and systems. Since its foundation, EDCF has had a collaborative relationship with the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF)/Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), because OECF/JBIC understands that they share similarities in their aid systems and self-help philosophies (JBIC 2007, 10). At the time of the foundation of EDCF, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) of the Korean government established one section to be in charge of examining the actions and policies of OECF, thus enabling EPB to learn from OECF’s ‘know-how,’

⁴⁰ In the EDCF-JBIC consultative meeting in 2006, when South Korea was preparing for DAC membership, EDCF asked questions on how aid should be managed after Korea became a DAC member.

⁴¹ A bureaucrat in Vietnam mentioned that procedures in Korean aid were similar to Japanese practices since the former learnt from the latter (Interview with MPI).

including its operations and organizational structure. OECF/JBIC even accepted EDCF staff as trainees to share its experiences and know-how (OECF 1996, 10; JBIC 2007, 10). Even after its establishment, EDCF and OECF/JBIC maintained frequent information exchanges and joint seminars (JBIC 2007, 10).⁴² In October 2006, EDCF and JBIC signed an operational agreement to share project information and experiences as well as to promote Korea-Japan aid co-ordination (JBIC 2007, 10–1). Specifically, JBIC promoted operational collaboration by transferring know-how on environmental guidelines, holding regular consultation meetings, harmonizing aid procedures, and allowing EDCF observers to participate in JBIC missions. In 2006, EDCF dispatched its staff members for half a year to JBIC in order to absorb know-how on project management and project evaluations. EDCF and JBIC were ready for co-financing: they had already implemented co-financing projects in the railway sector and were preparing for new co-financing projects in Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and India (Kondoh 2013, 143–4).

KOICA's institution building has also been assisted by Japan. At least until the 1990s, when KOICA had just been established, KOICA and JICA maintained a close partnership through regular meetings, on-the-job training (OJT) programs,⁴³ and MOFA's ODA dialogues (Interview with KOICA's Hanoi Office).⁴⁴ Intensive learning in the 1990s occurred because Korean aid had shifted from grant-based equipment provision to technical co-operation-based human resource development. The newly established KOICA had a keen need to absorb the richer experiences of the project-based technical co-operation of JICA (Kim and Seddon 2005, 177). In addition, based on an agreement made at a meeting between foreign ministers, it was recently decided that KOICA would implement joint projects with JICA in Cambodia,

⁴² Korea Exim Bank frequently referred Yen loan operations to OECF/JBIC through its Tokyo Representative Office.

⁴³ Staff members of KOICA were sent to JICA for operational trainings for three to six months.

⁴⁴ The ODA Dialogues, chaired by MOFA, were held once every one to two years to discuss Korea-Japan collaboration in aid policies. Yet, as KOICA accumulates its own capacity to operate aid projects, it may find fewer benefits in learning from Japan through institutionalized channels. Nonetheless, Korean aid has recently reinforced collaboration with Japanese aid since it probably still needs know-how to prepare for the implementation of DAC recommendations.

Tanzania and Vietnam. In fact, as far back as 2008, a joint project for irrigation in Cambodia had already been implemented as a model case (Interview with JICA Cambodia Office). In December 2010, KOICA and JICA held their first co-operation meeting to evaluate previous aid projects and select future areas of co-operation. The two aid agencies not only agreed to have better communication and information-sharing but more practically, they also confirmed areas for co-operation, such as joint training, joint evaluation, support for the safety of volunteers in the field, and joint workshops on research results (KOICA 2011, 309) (Kondoh 2013, 144).⁴⁵

After becoming a DAC member in 2010, South Korea is still learning. However, both EDCF and KOICA seem to be learning from the practices of numerous bilateral donors, not just limited to Japan. EDCF, as the institution for concessional loans, has learnt from Japan, France, Germany and Spain, while KOICA has been learning from most bilateral donors (Interview with KOICA, EDCF and KIEP).

This ongoing learning process can also be seen in the institutionalization process of South African aid. In South Africa, there was no absolute single aid model, just like the Japanese aid model for South Korea. Therefore, South Africa needed to learn from various aid models around the world. DIRCO, National Treasury, Parliament and other departments undertook numerous field surveys to build an understanding of aid models, operational and management approaches, institutional arrangements, and the legislative frameworks of other donors. Besharati (2013, 34) indicates that study tours were organized to Japan, Australia, Denmark, Sweden, France, US, South Korea, Mexico, Slovakia, Poland and Czech, while research work was also undertaken on the Department for International Development (DFID), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), New Zealand, Brazil and India. It was said that

⁴⁵ Learning is taking place at the field level as well. Both offices of KOICA and JICA in Dhaka signed a memorandum of understanding in 2011 to promote mutual communication and deepen their mutual partnership at the field level.

throughout the learning process, the individual aid model was reviewed in terms of its relevance to Africa and the priorities of South Africa (Interview with DIRCO).

In sum, if an emerging donor learns aid practices from DAC member countries, it logically creates a similar pattern to the DAC aid model. By contrast, if another emerging donor prefers non-DAC members for their learning models, it would not promote a convergence process. China, learning from the Japanese aid of the 1970s and 1980s that was at the time criticized by some DAC members, has built a commercial aid model. South Korea has been learning the DAC aid model and promoting convergence, however its learning through Japan resulted in the adherence to an ‘Asian’ version of the DAC aid model. South Africa learnt fairly well from wide-ranging donor models, and has selectively incorporated the relevant elements of individual donors into the aid model of South Africa. Learning may thus influence the process of convergence of emerging donors.

4.1.2 Donor Identities and Norms

How could norms and identities differentiate models of emerging donors? This paper categorizes four types of identities that can be used to differentiate aid models: a superpower identity, African middle-power identity, Islamic identity, and an Asian middle-power identity, respectively.

A Superpower Identity

A superpower identity is the most powerful driver for alternative norm-makers. As emerging superpowers may have global aspirations, and since they find they have limited influence on and voices within the established international aid regime, these donors find few incentives to participate in such a regime (Woods 2007; Rowlands 2008, 16–7).

Up until the 1980s, China had emphasized ideological solidarity with newly independent countries (Potter 2008, 10). Drawing from this ideological background, China tried to establish an alternative international order by assisting socialist and revolutionary

movements, as well as the Non-Aligned Movement (Brautigam 2009, 32).⁴⁶ Recently, while ideologies have changed from socialist solidarity to a 'rising superpower' (Atkinson 2010, 417), China's identity and norms as a superpower have been consistently maintained, although its approaches have changed from socialist solidarity to commercialism. As a result of this change, China has recently been deepening its confidence as an emerging superpower.⁴⁷

Yet China has also been exposed to criticism and pressure, particularly from DAC. Chinese policy-makers have been pursuing a pragmatic 'mini-max' approach in international institutions; minimizing costly obligations and constraints, while maximizing Chinese interests (Reilly 2012, 72). On the one hand, China has been making minimum efforts as 'a responsible major power', by increasing its humanitarian assistance to the tsunami-afflicted countries of Indian Ocean in 2004 and drought in Zimbabwe in 2009 (Brautigam 2009, 122). It would be also fair to mention that the Chinese Aid Model has recently introduced reforms to some extent. In April 2011, China published a White Paper on aid to increase the transparency of their aid practices, although the information disclosed in the document is very limited (Reilly 2012, 75). On the other hand, while China has opened a consultation channel with the OECD, this remains sporadic and superficial (Potter 2008, 11). According to Reilly (2012, 78), who analyzed China's selective compliance with the DAC aid model, China has complied with the principles of 'ownership,' 'alignment' and 'results-based management', whilst it does not

⁴⁶ Newly independent India also had an acute identity as a superpower among developing countries. With this identity, India maintained norms of solidarity with developing countries that India should engaged in global disparity (Chaturvedi 2012, 171).

⁴⁷ This development in aid could be seen in India's aid as well. India also started its aid activities for norms with Non-Aligned Movement as one of the leaders of the Third World. However, as with the case of China, recently has India changed its aid approach from solidarity-based to commercialist. What distinguishes India's aid from the China's is its attention to democracy. As Shiga (forthcoming) shows, despite it formally embracing the principle of non-interference in domestic issues, India has been engaging in democracy assistance. India joined the United Nations Democracy Fund in 2005 as its second largest contributor after the US, and established the India International Institute for Democracy and Election Management (IIDEM) in 2011. However, unlike that of some Western donors, its democracy assistance is based on narrow technical approaches, such as training for election administration and equipment provisions for electronic voting.

accept those of ‘harmonization,’ ‘mutual accountability,’ ‘conditionality,’ ‘support for local civil society,’ or ‘aid-only benefits recipients.’

China’s ‘mini-max’ approach is most clearly seen in the Chinese attitude to the Paris Declaration; China signed it as a recipient not as a donor.⁴⁸ Thus, while Japan might be a norm-skeptic, China is likely to be a future norm-challenger (Potter 2008, 11–2) or a potential norm-maker (Reilly 2012, 91). Although Woods (2008, 1212, 1221) observes that China does not necessarily upset or challenge the existing international aid regime by setting its own standards, and that China could just quietly offer alternative options to recipients through its ‘silent revolution’, at least it could be said that China at the moment is a norm-selector. It neither resists all norms set by DAC nor basically accepts them – it retains indifference to them at this moment, but has the potential to challenge them in future. In fact, in 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao praised Chinese aid by mentioning that “China succeeded in establishing an aid model, which has Chinese characteristics,” while the Chinese White Paper in 2011 argued that China’s voice would be bigger hereafter (Reilly 2012, 90–1)⁴⁹. In sum, ‘China Rules,’ ‘Beijing Consensus,’ BRICS Bank and AIIB⁵⁰ illustrate the distinct alternative international order and norms advocated by China.⁵¹

⁴⁸ For China, the economic benefits derived from participation in an international aid regime are relatively limited. Meanwhile, China may selectively emphasize an officially declared identity as the world largest developing country to pursue its own aid strategies and to exercise a veto over DAC norms (Suzuki 2013, 260).

⁴⁹ The Chinese response to international pressures is different from that of the middle-powers. China has been criticized for its tight economic relationship with the Bashir regime in Sudan. With international pressures before the Beijing Olympic Games, President Hu Jintao had a ‘frank discussion’ with President Bashir from 2007 to ‘urge’ him to accept a UN peace-keeping operation in Darfur (Brautigam 2009, 281–2). This response went beyond mere norm-making. It was arguably motivated by some kind of feeling of responsibility as a superpower.

⁵⁰ China has been reinforcing its leadership in the international community. China not only actively uses the already established international regime by increasing its financial contributions to the UN but it is also establishing an alternative international regime: China has been in the leading position to establish an intergovernmental AIIB.

⁵¹ A Chinese scholar, Mao Xiaojing (2010), in his examination of Chinese diplomacy, argued that the emerging China at the moment should put a higher priority on (1) South-South co-operation to increase its bargaining power over developed countries, rather than DAC membership, and (2) taking a leadership role with emerging donors (Suzuki 2013, 259).

African Middle Power Identity

The convergence of the middle powers toward the DAC aid model would be inevitable in spite of the difference of degrees. African middle power identity has more compromising norms to balance against DAC-led norms and South-South co-operation. South Africa under the apartheid regime maintained its identity as a developed country, which functioned as the outpost of white civilization in ‘the Dark Continent’ (Sidiropoulos 2012, 221). Since the collapse of apartheid, South Africa has had complicated identities as an upper middle-income country (UMIC),⁵² a member of BRICS and G-20, an aid recipient and donor, an African country, a leader of South-South co-operation, and an outstanding center of triangular co-operation (Besharati 2013, 58). Within this complex identity, the ANC regime particularly emphasizes its African identity and ‘a nation of the South’ identity (Sidiropoulos 2012, 221). Since the anti-apartheid struggle by the ANC was for basic human rights, the ANC’s clear position of supporting pro-‘universal values’ such as human rights, civil liberties and democratization naturally reflect on the diplomatic policies of the new South Africa (Alden and le Pere 2003, 12). The new government replaced career diplomats with black South Africans, and by 2000 half of them were black. The Mandela regime welcomed the active engagement of civil society in the consultative process (Alden and le Pere 2003, 13–4, 33). The change in dominant norms and major players resulted in changes in the aid model. In the case of aid policy, particularly for SADPA, norms and identities derived from its domestic poverty and African solidarity seem to matter.

In 2007, leftists gained power within the ANC, and this resulted in rather populist redistributive policy to social sectors domestically (Besharati 2013, 12). As is the case with Nordic countries (Noël and Thérien 1995), active commitments in domestic welfare policy may be linked to activeness in international aid policy. In 2007, the ANC also suggested the

⁵² While South Africa has been the outstanding economic power over the region, it remains a middle-income country (Alden and le Pere 2003, 28).

concept of '*ubuntu*' (humanity); that is, South Africa should share with other African brothers in the spirit of solidarity and co-operation. The concept of *ubuntu* is reflected in the diplomatic approaches of South Africa. The White Paper by DIRCO argues for a 'diplomacy of *ubuntu*' that includes the values and notions of interconnectedness, partnership, and collaboration within the African and global family (Besharati 2013, 25). Accordingly South Africa stresses its difference from traditional donors, its commitment to its identity as a nation of the South and its alignment to developing countries. South Africa not only prefers terms such as 'partner' rather than 'donor,' and 'development co-operation' rather than 'aid'⁵³ but also avoids conditionality, which might be indicative of sensitivity to South Africa's prevailing image of economic dominance, as a big brother in Africa (Sidiropoulos 2012, 232).

Yet, complex identities also reflect inconsistency in the aid norms and behaviors of South Africa. Despite its emphasis on human rights, civil liberties and democracy, South Africa has assisted human rights violators in Nigeria, Algeria, Libya and Cuba, as it had maintained solidarity with them during the anti-apartheid struggle (Alden and le Pere 2003, 12). South Africa has been careful to offer assistance to its neighbor, Swaziland, probably because its kingdom records poor governance performance (Interviews with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Kingdom of Swaziland, and Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, the Kingdom of Swaziland). In 1998, South Africa made a military intervention into Lesotho under the pretext of restoring civil order, but actually in order to secure water resources from Lesotho for South Africa, and also to prevent its social unrest from crossing the border (Alden and le Pere 2003, 23–4).

The Government of South Africa is actually divided by norms. For instance, the foreign ministry has a tense relationship with DTI and is marginalized by the powerful defence

⁵³ DIRCO (2011) defines a development partnership as 'co-operation between developing countries in the field of aid, trade, security, [and] politics to promote economic and social well-being' (Besharati 2013, 37).

ministry (Alden and le Pere 2003, 16–7).⁵⁴ Even inside of the foreign ministry, there have been divisions between idealistic internationalists, who “returned from long years in exile with an orientation towards ‘a demonstrably greater degree of solidarity with the collective problems of the developing world’”, and realistic neo-mercantilists, who belonged to the apartheid-era ruling government and focus on “the importance of trade and self-interests over all else” (Alden and le Pere 2003, 14, 26). In addition, civil society organizations (CSOs), once engaging in public policy-making, have been alienated and marginalized from the domain of public policy under the Mbeki administration (Alden and le Pere 2003, 17, 33).⁵⁵ As a result, the recent diplomatic policy of South Africa is incorporating the financial, commercial, political, and defence interests of South Africa (Alden and le Pere 2003, 19).⁵⁶ These confusing norms are reflective of South Africa’s aid model – it officially advocates DAC norms while it also maintains the above-mentioned salient self-interests of South Africa, some of which may not be compatible with these DAC norms.

Islamic Identity

Islamic identity is rather unexpectedly compatible with DAC norms. Arab donors established a unique aid model; however, as noted above, they also have maintained a close relationship with DAC. This could be partially a result of their charity-based activities, rather than commercial considerations. Arab donors hence created a hybrid Arab aid model, incorporating some elements of DAC systems into their own aid system.

⁵⁴ It might be controversial that the interests of South Africa’s military industry are not negligible; South Africa was the 10th largest arm manufacturing country in 1994, in which 800 military companies employed a labor force of 50,000 people, earning 1.03 billion rand by exporting to 61 countries. The armament industry was also the second largest exporter in the manufacturing sector in South Africa (Alden and le Pere 2003, 24). Moreover, the South African military has been involved in the provision of assistance to the security sector in the region, and it has participated in the election observation missions in Zimbabwe (Interview with SADC).

⁵⁵ President Mbeki also weakened the role of the parliament and the ruling ANC in public policy (Alden and le Pere 2003, 32–3).

⁵⁶ However, South Africa also has channels to advance its business interests besides aid (Interview with DIRCO). Therefore it is unlikely that South African aid is fully motivated by economic interests.

Asian Middle Power Identity

Asian middle-power identity is inclined towards DAC norms.⁵⁷ Middle powers in general seem to be inherently sensitive to international pressure. South Korea does appear to be more vulnerable to international pressure to modify its aid behaviors. South Korea indeed boosted its aid activities and institutions in the 1980s due to international criticism of the enormous Korean trade surplus. South Korea has a long-standing ambition to gain the status of an ‘advanced’ or ‘developed’ country (Kim and Seddon 2005, 163). Therefore, under the Roh Moo-hyun Presidency, Korea undertook aid reform to satisfy the explicit and implicit requirements of DAC (Kondoh 2013, 146).

In addition, South Korea identifies itself as a middle power, reliant not on hard power but on soft power. South Korean leaders perceived that their country lacks the option of raising its status through hard power. To legitimize its aid policy, it is obliged to comply with global trends and the international aid regime (Kondoh 2013, 146). However Korean aid rarely advocated humanitarian values until the late 1990s. Due to the conservative nature of the society at that time, while 57 percent of the public supported commercial interests in aid, only 18.7 per cent of Korean people advocated humanitarian considerations (Lumsdaine and Halloran. 2007, 227, 34). Nonetheless, from the end of the 1990s, Korean society experienced a drastic transformation. Aid-related NGOs as well as volunteers are not only quantitatively increasing but also qualitatively more influential, reflecting the rapidly emerging civil society in South Korea (Lumsdaine and Halloran 2007, 237–8). With the visible emergence of NGOs, the Kim Dae-Jung administration allowed them to have a voice. In September 2000, he invited 20 representatives from civil society, including NGOs, to the Presidential Commission on Sustainable Development (PCSD), in which NGOs successfully claimed a more active foreign

⁵⁷ In this paper, only South Korea is represented among donors of Asian middle-power identity due to the limited scope of this comparative study. Perhaps, Japan and Taiwan could be added as other cases in this category (Kondoh 2012). However, it would certainly not be appropriate to regard all Asian middle powers as having this identity, creating a similar aid model. So, in this sense, this labeling is rather tentative.

aid and assistance for North Korea. From the participatory government of President Roh Moo-hyun, NGOs were able to increase their official voices in support of aid policies. The sudden shift in Korean society toward humanitarianism provides an opportunity for MOFAT as well, which has been rather isolated from other government ministries and agencies. MOFAT, sharing common interests with NGOs and volunteers, built a policy coalition with them (Kim 2008, 16) (Kondoh 2013, 148–50).⁵⁸

Thus, through the changes in norms of influential players and their relative power balance particularly, Korean aid has strongly promoted convergence, advocating more ‘universal values.’ In fact, as Korean presidents after Kim Dae-Jung expressed their compliance with international norms on aid practices, civil society has been also increasing its voice in domestic welfare and international aid (Lumsdaine and Halloran 2007, 236). Recently, MOFA, KOICA and civil society, as norm entrepreneurs, have built a coalition to promote the norms of the DAC aid model.⁵⁹ Recent voices for the development of international norms on aid, which have been prevalent not only among members of civil society groups but also from within MOFA and KOICA, could be an influential factor in acceptance of the DAC aid model. On the other hand, policy-makers of MOSF-EDCF have also supported the traditional norms that economic development can be achieved through loan schemes to economic sectors. This mixture of different norms and identities has resulted in the creation of the Asian DAC model in South Korea.

⁵⁸ Since the foreign ministry often lacks the material instruments to promote its interests, it often emphasizes specific norms in order to take a leadership role in aid policy, while the economic ministry has access to the material instruments of aid policy, such as economic assistance. In addition, unlike the economic ministry, which is often embedded in vested domestic interests, the foreign ministry is rather isolated from them. This could be explain why untied aid is promoted by MOFAT and opposed by MOSF.

⁵⁹ Even inside of KOICA, there is a perception gap between the older generation in favor of a realistic aid approach and the younger generation who support more idealistic aid practices (Interview with KOICA’s Sri Lanka Office).

4.2 Convergence and Divergence by Recipients

4.2.1 Recipient Perceptions

It is not trivial that aid consists of behaviors between donors and recipients, and therefore is inevitably relational. The fact that aid is offered when it is needed by recipients leads us to further questions: why do recipients accept or not accept aid from specific emerging donors? That is to say, it matters how recipients see aid models of emerging donors. As Reilly (2012, 91) points out, if China is a successful norm-maker in aid, recipient countries will be ready to accept Chinese norms.

Although emerging donors are generally welcomed by recipients, they frequently invite the wariness of recipients as well. Bangladeshi people, both in the government and society, are aware of political motivations in Chinese aid and self-interest in Indian aid (Interview with journalists, Bangladesh, and Ministry of Industry, Bangladesh). As another example, South Africa has also been viewed with caution by neighboring countries. It had to face not only an adverse legacy of the past apartheid system⁶⁰ but also the negative perceptions of South Africa as ‘a hegemon, big brother, and regional bully’ (Besharati 2013, 23). The common critique is that South Africa is proactively engaged in aid only for its own selfish economic interests (Sidiropoulos 2012, 218). These cautious discourses are even heard among the high-ranking government officials of recipients. For instance, a government official of Botswana explained that Botswana has not received aid from South Africa, except for revenue from SACU and loans from DBSA, traditionally due to its opposition to the apartheid regime and more recently for its high economic dependency on South Africa.

With wariness and sensitivities prevalent across African countries, overtly realpolitik options for South Africa’s self-interests are not usually possible in terms of aid from South Africa. This is part of the reason why South Africa dilutes its donor’s interests in aid by clearly advocating DAC norms that donors should only benefit the recipient’s development. The case

⁶⁰ Aid to ease negative perceptions of recipients to the donor’s past behavior can also be seen in the Korean aid for Vietnam and the Japanese aid for Southeast Asia.

of Botswana also illustrates that the perceptions of recipient countries matter. Despite the rich natural resources available in Botswana, the Chinese presence is not visible except in the construction sector, because the Parliament in democratic Botswana would not approve the proposal to receive aid from non-democratic China. South Africa's careful bilateral approaches to African recipients reflect its focuses on multilateral channels such as the AU and SADC (Besharati 2013, 23). In short, to ease the skepticism of recipients, it has been necessary for the aid model of South Africa to incorporate DAC-like norms, which emphasize an equal partnership between donors and recipients.⁶¹

4.2.2 Recipient Needs

In addition to the perceptions of recipients toward donors, recipients may indirectly influence donor behaviors through recipient needs. Walz and Ramachandran (2011, 21) argue that the recipients of South-South co-operation do welcome alternatives to aid from Western donors. Despite criticism of 'neo-mercantilist' aid by emerging donors, particularly China and India, recipient countries have appreciated the trinity of aid-trade-investment as beneficial to their economic development (Woods 2008, 1218). For most developing countries, successful economic development in China offers credible and legitimate approaches to aid and development (Brautigam 2009, 11). By contrast, the unrealistic approaches by DAC, with drastic changes occurring every decade, have been criticized by African political leaders. Ex-President Chissano of Mozambique criticized the questionable values of Western donors, which ignore needs for infrastructure development and the demands of the local private sector in Africa. The Senegalese President was also critical of European donors that had failed to disburse infrastructure development projects pledged eight years ago, while China had swiftly implemented inexpensive infrastructure development projects (Brautigam 2009, 10–1, 133–4). In addition, Western donors have not offered aid to the manufacturing sectors in Africa for

⁶¹ Rowlands (2008, 17) understands argues that emerging donors could increase their legitimacy and acceptability for recipients by aligning with DAC and EU donors.

decades: as little as five percent of World Bank's loans to the industrial and trading sectors were allocated to SSA from 2002 to 2007, and only one percent of traditional donor aid was distributed to the industrial sector in Africa (Brautigam 2009, 91–2).

With the mismatch of DAC members' aid with recipients, it is natural for discontent political leaders in developing countries to welcome non-DAC aid.⁶² For instance, Meles Zenawi Asres, the late Ethiopian Prime Minister, impressed at the different development paradigm of East Asia from the West, introduced a long-term agricultural development vision and interventionist industrialization strategy in partnership with China. With the aid from China, Ethiopia has also actively developed infrastructure in roads, energy, telecommunications and economic development zones to attract FDI specifically from China (Ohno 2013, 208–9, 212–4).

A similar mismatch with DAC aid can also be seen in Southern Africa. Although infrastructure development in Southern Africa is reported to require US\$93.3 billion, only 45.3 percent of funds have already been disbursed (Interview with DBSA). President Ian Khama of Botswana complained that, although Botswana became an upper-middle income country (UMIC) through its own great efforts, it is still being substantially 'punished,' since their aid for UMIC is limited. Botswana therefore accepts South Africa's investment projects for infrastructure development in Botswana.

Swaziland, a small, landlocked, lower middle-income country (LMIC), has not been assisted by donors despite its huge aid demands for a nation with a high poverty ratio of 60 percent (Interview with Ministry of Health, the Kingdom of Swaziland). In a situation similar to Botswana, Swaziland has been avoiding aid from South Africa, with the exception of SACU revenue, which favors small countries. In addition, Western donors raised concerns about the

⁶² It would certainly be possible for recipients to choose non-Western DAC members, such as Japan and South Korea. However, non-Western DAC members seem to take positions that lie rather in between the Western DAC members and non-DAC members. In this sense, non-DAC members work as the more substantially distinct alternative to all DAC member countries.

poor governance of the Kingdom of Swaziland. By circumventing aid from South Africa, and by supplementing limited aid from Western donors, Swaziland has had to raise alternative funds from Taiwan for the agriculture and health sectors,⁶³ Cuba and Turkey for the health sector, India for the agricultural sector, and Kuwait and African Development Bank (AfDB) for the transportation sector (Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Kingdom of Swaziland). Hence, when a recipient has its access to aid limited, particularly by DAC members due to poor governance, the only source left is non-DAC donors, which have different standards for aid provision. The consistent needs of poorly governed recipients may hinder the convergence process of emerging donors.

The recipients may also demand non-DAC aid models in Asia as well. The Sri Lankan Department of External Resources (ERD) clearly argues that Sri Lanka, as a LMIC, needs concessional loans and that fortunately, emerging donors such as China and South Korea offer concessional loans (Interview with ERD, Sri Lanka). Donor agencies also recognize that the Government of Sri Lanka does welcome Asian donors rather than the West (Interview with KOICA Sri Lanka Office).⁶⁴ Western donors are preparing their exit strategies from Sri Lanka due to the status of Sri Lanka as a LMIC and its human rights records under the Rajapaksa regime.⁶⁵ In Sri Lanka, the social sectors have already received very large amounts of assistance from traditional donors, yet aid for infrastructure development has been relatively insufficient. Along with the cases of Botswana and Swaziland, middle-income countries do actually need alternative aid models to the DAC aid model, which has not been sufficiently proactive in its assistance for infrastructure development in middle-income countries. Similarly in Bangladesh, while the social sectors are supported by NGOs and traditional donors,

⁶³ Swaziland has consistently maintained a diplomatic relationship with Taiwan. The government official of Swaziland said he appreciates Taiwan's aid for its swift and flexible operations and its needs-based response (Interview with Ministry of Health, the Kingdom of Swaziland).

⁶⁴ As seen in the case of Swaziland, sanctioned countries may find alternative opportunities in aid by emerging donors.

⁶⁵ This is probably less the case since new President Maithripala Sirisena, inaugurated in January 2015, reversed the positions of China and the Western donors at least to some extent.

assistance to the economic sectors by emerging donors is valuable for developing infrastructure, attracting FDI and ultimately promoting industrialization (Interview with Ministry of Industry, Bangladesh).⁶⁶

Emerging donors are playing a certain role in supplementing the division of labor. In the DAC aid model, assistance is concentrated heavily on the least developed countries (LDCs) while emerging donors widely assist recipients regardless of whether they are considered LDCs, LMICs or UMICs. The limited presence of traditional donors and the active engagement of emerging donors seem to bring about competition among emerging donors. The increasing Chinese economic and military presence in Sri Lanka under the Rajapaksa administration did stimulate India, a neighbor of Sri Lanka. Against this background, India has recently reinforced its assistance to Sri Lanka by providing railway projects and housing projects for Tamils in the north.⁶⁷

Thus, recipients are not necessarily passive actors that are dependent on donors. The rise of China in the international aid community might actually instead expand the policy space, allowing recipients to take on greater ownership (Ohno 2013, 199). Recipient countries may exercise indirect influence over what aid models donors should build, whether intentionally or not. Their potential influence is not just limited to individual emerging donors; the UN (2013) included ‘Transform Economies for Jobs and Inclusive Growth’ as one of the challenges of the post-2015 development agenda, which is relevant to the approaches of Asian donors, and will be a part of the international aid regime. At the micro level, Bangladesh succeeded in reducing

⁶⁶ Actually, it is not traditional donors but emerging donors that underpin the development strategy of Bangladesh, Vision 2020. In Vision 2020, Bangladesh outlined its target of transforming itself from an agriculture-based economy to a middle-income country through industrialization. Industrialization is a core component of the development strategy in Bangladesh to absorb surplus population in rural areas and channel it into labor-intensive industries (Interview with Ministry of Industry, Bangladesh).

⁶⁷ Unlike Cambodia, which accepts aid for both the economic and social sectors, the needs of aid in Sri Lanka in general concentrate primarily on the economic and infrastructure sector. This is partly because socialist policy in Sri Lanka performed fairly well through its investments in the social sectors. It is also partially because Sri Lanka is already an UMIC, which may shift its attention to the economic sector and may provide greater financial sustainability for loans. However emerging donors do also offer assistance to social sectors. The division between DAC’s aid for the social sectors and an emerging donor’s aid for economic sector is not clear in Sri Lanka.

the interest rates of India's loans (Interview with Indian High Commission, Bangladesh). This could be a step to increasing the concessionality of Indian aid.

5. Conclusions

This paper discussed why some emerging donors approached convergence with the DAC aid model and why others did not (see Table 1). It was argued that the different levels of convergence of emerging donors are derived from factors such as how they learnt from other donors, what norms and identities within their roles are dominant, and how aid recipients may have an influence on donor behaviors.⁶⁸

Table 1. Comparisons of Emerging Donors: Difference in Convergence and Factors

Aid Models		Emerging Superpower Aid Model	Southern Hybrid Aid Model	Islamic Aid Model	Asian DAC Aid Model
Degree of Convergence		Low	Moderate	Relatively High	High
Exogenous Factors	Convergence by globalization	No	No	No	Yes
	International context & diplomatic strategies	Not relevant	Relevant	Relevant	Relevant
	Aid-related international pressure	Less sensitive	Sensitive	Less sensitive	Sensitive
	Perceptions of major aid recipients	Not relevant to convergence	Relevant	Not relevant	Not relevant
Endogenous Factors	Aid purposes	Commercial	Humanitarian and commercial	Humanitarian	Humanitarian and commercial
	Learning process	Yes, but not relevant to convergence	Yes and relevant	NA	Yes, both relevant and not relevant
	Identities and norms	Superpower identities/ Potential norm-makers	Regional power identities/ Norm-takers	Middle-power identities/ Norm-takers	Middle-power identities/ Norm-takers

Source: Prepared by the author

⁶⁸ Reasons for convergence may also differ: Taiwan is promoting convergence at the formal level; this is for proving its statehood and differentiating it from rivals (China) (Kondoh 2012).

However, this does not mean that the implications of convergence might be the same for DAC members and recipient countries. As seen in the critique by Joaquim Alberto Chissano, ex-President of Mozambique, aid from DAC members has certainly been ignoring recipient needs for infrastructure and private sector development. Brautigam (2009, 134) also points out, from the viewpoint of recipients, that DAC might be seen as a ‘cartel of aid.’ Rather it might be DAC that is expected to learn from various aid models of non-DAC members, which could be both complementary with the DAC aid model and compatible with development effectiveness rather than aid effectiveness. As Mawdsley (2012, 218) indicates, there are “tremendous opportunities and challenges that the diverse array of (re-)emerging development partners has brought to this potential new era of development co-operation.” In fact, in 2011, facing a new circumstance, DAC has published a statement titled ‘Welcoming New Partnerships in International Development Co-operation,’ by positively stating:

We welcome the contribution of all providers of development co-operation resources and expertise, and hope to forge new relationships with these new partners through open dialogue without preconditions. Before such a dialogue can become meaningful, it is important to recognize certain fundamental realities, and to acknowledge the diversity that exists within the broader development community. We recognize that many nations engaged in South-South co-operation have a dual status as both recipients and providers. We believe that such duality can enrich the international dialogue and enhance the effort to promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth. We emphasize that engaging in mutually beneficial learning activities - or joint or trilateral development cooperation programs – can serve as a useful platform for increased impact and enhanced co-operation with providers from the North and the South, especially at country level, in a manner that will serve the interest of the poor, without requiring acceptance of the norms and rules required of DAC member states. [...] We may have different methods, but our common

interest is in reducing global poverty and increasing sustainable and inclusive economic growth (emphases added).

Hence, DAC itself has recently embarked on a quest for new aid architecture with emerging donors by more flexibly acknowledging new definitions, norms and approaches in aid. DAC has even made attempts at establishing and institutionalizing a collaborative relationship with emerging donors. China has certainly had a huge impact on reshaping the landscape of international development, economy, society and politics (Ramo 2004, 3); DAC notably launched the DAC-China Study Group. According to the DAC Global Relations Strategy, DAC recently and actively invited participants from emerging donors – China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa and UAE. The diverse distance of emerging donors from the DAC aid model is essentially promoting a shift to the location where the DAC aid model should stand. The DAC aid model will continue to be a very important reference point for emerging donors; however it might represent just one of a range of available aid models. Traditional donors may be expected to be patient with different but ‘effective enough’ donors.

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Abstract (in Japanese)

要約

本稿は、いわゆる新興ドナーの援助モデルを、DAC 援助モデルとの距離において比較分析するものである。新興経済国を含む新興ドナーには、DAC が考える援助の理想型を積極的に取り入れるドナーもあれば、むしろ DAC との距離を保ち続けるドナーも見られる。では、なぜ DAC 援助モデルとの距離が異なるのであろうか。

この問いに対し本稿は、第一に、先行研究のレビューを行い、DAC 援助モデルを要約し、援助モデルの形成・変容をもたらす要因について整理する。特に、国際政治論では注目されつつも、新興国分析には応用されてきたと言い難い構成主義のアプローチを取り入れると同時に、これまで援助研究で受動的なアクターとして描かれがちだった援助受入国についても、新興ドナーの援助モデル形成に一定の役割を演じうることを示す。

第二に、アラブ・ドナー、中国、インド、南アフリカ、韓国といった主要ドナーの特徴を簡潔に概観する。分析の結果、アラブ・ドナーはイスラム援助モデルを、中国・インドは新興超大国援助モデルを、南アフリカは南南協力を取り込んだハイブリッド援助モデルを、そして韓国はアジア版の DAC 援助モデルを形成していることを示した。DAC 援助モデルとの距離については、中国・インドが DAC 援助モデルから距離を保つ一方、南アフリカとアラブ・ドナーの援助モデルは DAC 援助モデルを取り込み、韓国援助モデルは DAC 援助モデルを大胆に導入するようになっていると論じる。

第三に、新興ドナーの援助モデルが DAC 援助モデルとの距離において多様であるのは、援助受入国の認識や、ドナーの学習プロセス、ドナーの規範・アイデンティティが各ドナーによって異なるからである。ドナーへの認識に関して見ると、中国援助が援助受入国から一般的に高い評価を得ている理由の一つは、中国が DAC 援助とは異なったアプローチを採っていることによる。南アフリカは、自国と近隣諸国間の非対称的な政治的・経済的関係に起因する自国に対する近隣諸国の警戒心を和らげるために、SACU・DBSA を

通じたある種の実質的「支援」を行いつつも、DAC 援助モデルを取り込むことになる。

ドナーによる他の援助モデルに関する学習は、南アフリカと韓国で明確に見られる。規範・アイデンティティは援助モデルの構築・再構築に強い影響があり、中国は「超大国アイデンティティ」を、アラブ・ドナーは「宗教アイデンティティ」を持ち、これらの強いアイデンティティ・規範は各援助モデルの独自性の基礎となり、既存の国際援助レジームに潜在的に挑戦する可能性を内在している。「規範構成者」(norm-maker)としての中国とは異なり、ミドル・パワーは「規範利用者」(norm-takers)として既存の国際援助レジームを総じて遵守する。すなわち南アフリカは、DAC 援助モデルとアフリカ諸国との連帯のバランスをとり、韓国は DAC の正式メンバーとして DAC 援助モデルへの収斂を推進することになる。

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Yasutami Shimomura and Wang Ping